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THE CONCEPT AND THE RULE OF LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The Rule of Law is one of the most important political ideals of
our time.' It is one of a cluster of ideals constitutive of modern
political morality, the others being human rights, democracy, and
perhaps also the principles of free market economy. Open any
newspaper and you will see the Rule of Law cited and
deployed-usually as a matter of reproach, occasionally as an
affirmative aspiration, and almost always as a benchmark of
political legitimacy. Here are a few examples, plucked at random
from the world's press:
In November 2007, when then-President Pervez
Musharraf of Pakistan fired the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Pakistan and had him placed under
house arrest, his actions were seen around the world
as a crisis of the Rule of Law. Law societies and bar
associations all over the world protested, and, in
Pakistan itself, thousands of judges and lawyers
demonstrated in the streets. Hundreds of them were
beaten and arrested.2
* Earlier this year the Financial Times lamented that
the "[absence of the [Riule of [Liaw undermines
Russia's economy."' Specifically, the British
newspaper associated the absence of the Rule of Law
1 I capitalize the term Rule of Law to distinguish it from a rule of law, which typically
refers to a particular legal rule, such as the rule against perpetuities or the rule in the United
States that the President must be at least thirty-five years old. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 8.
2 See Editorial, Gathering Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, at A32 ("The American Bar
Association, its members horrified by events in Pakistan, has written to General Musharraf
and condemned his 'profound breach of the rule of law.' "); Noelle McGrenera et al., Letter to
the Editor, Pakistan's Leaders Must Respect the Rule of Law, TIMES (London), Nov. 14, 2007,
at 18 (calling on "military regime [of Pakistan] to respect the rule of law" and signed by chairs
of bar associations in England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales).
E xile in Siberia: Absence ofthe Rule ofLaw Undermines Russia's Economy, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 7, 2008, at 10; see also Russia Must Abjure Political Violence: To Win Respect,
Moscow Must Itself Respect Rule of Law, FIN. TIMES (London), July 20, 2007, at 10 (discussing
Russia's role in deteriorating East-West relations).
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with the irregularity of Vladimir Putin regime's
proceedings against Mikhail Khodorkovsky.4 But the
newspaper also offered the more general suggestions
that "no prosperous market economy or fair society
can flourish without the [R] ule of [L] aw" and that this
is "a lesson [that] foreign investors must heed."5
Practices and policies associated with the war on
terrorism are constantly being evaluated and found
wanting against the criterion of the Rule of Law. The
most prominent, of, course is the incarceration of
hundreds of detainees by the United States at
Guantdnamo Bay in Cuba. A few days after the
publication of its article on Russia and the Rule of
Law, the Financial Times thundered again: "Military
tribunals are not the way: Guantanamo is beyond the
[Riule of [L]aw and should be shut."
* Many readers will remember that during the electoral
debacle in Florida in 2000, the Rule of Law was
invoked at each stage on all sides of every issue,
culminating in the famous dissent by Justice Stevens
in Bush v. Gore: "Although we may never know with
complete certainty the identity of the winner of this
year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser
is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the
judge as an impartial guardian of the [Riule of
[LIaw."7
4 Exile in Siberia, supra note 3.
5 Id.; see also Arkady Ostrovsky, Investment Dries up as Rule of Law Seeps Away in
Russia, FIN. TIMEs (London), Mar. 1, 2005, at 20 (discussing inability of investors to do
business in atmosphere of complete lawlessness).
6 Military Tribunals Are Not the Way: Guantanamo Is Beyond the Rule of Law and
Should Be Shut, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 12, 2008, at 8.
7 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally
Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Flbrida)?, 21 L. &
PHn. 137 (2002) (describing contestation of concept of Rule of Law and applying to context
of 2000 presidential election).
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Thousands of other examples could be cited. The Rule of Law is
seen as a fragile but crucial ideal, and one that is appropriately
invoked whenever governments try to get their way by arbitrary and
oppressive action or by short-circuiting the norms and procedures
laid down in their countries' laws or constitution. Interfering with
the courts, jailing someone without legal justification, detaining
people without any safeguards of due process, manipulating the
constitution for partisan advantage-all of these are seen as abuses
of the Rule of Law.
In this Essay, I would like to consider the role of the Rule of Law
in general jurisprudence, that is, in the conceptual work that we do
in legal philosophy when we try to explain what "law" is.8 I put
forward two propositions. First, I shall argue that our
understanding of the Rule of Law and our understanding of the
concept of law ought to be much more closely connected than they
are in modern jurisprudence. Second, I shall argue that our
understanding of the Rule of Law should emphasize not only the
value of settled, determinate rules and the predictability that such
rules make possible, but also the importance of the procedural and
argumentative aspects of legal practice.
I shall argue, moreover, that these two propositions are
connected. Grasping the connection between the Rule of Law and
the concept of law is much easier when we understand the Rule of
Law at least partly in terms of procedural and argumentative
themes rather than purely in terms of determinacy and
predictability. The procedural aspect of the Rule of Law helps bring
our conceptual thinking about law to life, and an understanding of
legal systems that emphasizes argument in the courtroom as much
as the existence and recognition of rules provides the basis for a
much richer understanding of the values that the Rule of Law
comprises in modern political argument.
8 The term law is used in two ways. Sometimes it is used in the sense of a legal system:
"The United States has a system of law." Other times it is used in the sense of legal
propositions: "It is the law that you have to file a tax return by April 15." The two senses are
clearly connected. A considerable amount of what I am going to say in this Essay will focus
on the first sense. This is the sense in which I will argue that the Rule of Law and the
concept of law need to be brought closer together. In Part IX, I will address the connection
between the Rule of Law and the concept of law in the second sense.
2008]
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II. WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW?
The Rule of Law is a multi-faceted ideal. Most conceptions of this
ideal, however, give central place to a requirement that people in
positions of authority should exercise their power within a
constraining framework of public norms, rather than on the basis of
their own preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual
sense of right and wrong.9
Beyond this, many conceptions of the Rule of Law place great
emphasis on legal certainty, predictability, and settlement; on the
determinacy of the norms that are upheld in society; and on the
reliable character of their administration by the state.' Citizens-it
is said-need predictability in the conduct of their lives and
businesses." There may be no escaping legal constraints in the
circumstances of modern life, but freedom is nevertheless possible
if people know in advance how the law will operate, and how they
must act to avoid its having a detrimental impact on their affairs.
Knowing in advance how the law will operate enables one to plan
around its requirements. 2 And knowing that one can count on the
law to protect certain personal rights and property rights enables
each citizen to deal effectively with other people and the state. On
this account, the Rule of Law is violated when the norms that are
applied by officials do not correspond to the norms that have been
made public to the citizens, or when officials act on the basis of their
own discretion rather than norms laid down in advance. If actions
of this sort become endemic, then not only are people's expectations
9 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 17 (2001) ("[A central]
element of the [Riule of [Liaw, constraint from external authority,... helps assure that the
processes of government, rather than the predilections of the individual decisionmaker,
govern.").
10 See id. at 4-12 (describing other elements common to conceptions of Rule of Law).
" See Sean Keveney, Note, The Dishonesty Rule: A Proposal for Reform, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 381,382 (2002) ("A [Riule of [Liaw that fails to yield results with a minimum degree of
consistency or predictability is of little use as an analytical tool and ceases to serve the
legitimate goal of ordering the conduct of citizens.").
12 See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTrIUTION OF LIBERTY 156-57 (1960) ("The rationale of
securing to each individual a known range within which he can decide on his actions is to
enable him to make the fullest use of his knowledge.... The law tells him what facts he may
count on and thereby extends the range within which he can predict the consequences of his
actions.").
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disappointed, but they will increasingly find themselves unable to
form any expectations at all, and the horizons of their planning and
their economic activity will diminish accordingly.
A conception of the Rule of Law like the one just outlined
emphasizes the virtues that Lon Fuller discussed in The Morality of
Law: the prominence of general norms as a basis of governance; the
clarity, publicity, stability, consistency, and prospectivity of those
norms; and congruence between the law on the books and the way
in which public order is actually administered. 3 On Fuller's
account, the Rule of Law does not directly require anything
substantive: for example, it does not require that we have any
particular liberty. All it requires is that the state should do
whatever it wants to do in an orderly, predictable way, giving us
plenty of advance notice by publicizing the general norms on which
its actions will be based, and that it should then stick to those
norms and not arbitrarily depart from them even if it seems
politically advantageous to do so.'4 Requirements of this sort are
sometimes described as procedural, but I think that is a
misdescription. Rather, they are formal and structural in character:
they emphasize the forms of governance and the formal
qualities-like generality, clarity, and prospectivity-that are
supposed to characterize the norms on which state action is based.
There is, however, a separate current of thought in the Rule of
Law tradition that does emphasize procedural issues. The Rule of
Law is not just about general rules; it is about their impartial
administration. For example, one of the great nineteenth century
theorists of the Rule of Law, Albert Venn Dicey, placed at least as
much emphasis on the normal operation of the ordinary courts as he
did on the characteristics of the norms they administered. 5 A
procedural understanding of the Rule of Law requires not only that
officials apply the rules as they are set out; it requires application
13 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing "routes to
disaster" to be avoided in attempt to create and maintain system of legal rules).
' See id. at 46-91 (providing account of elements required of system subjecting human
conduct to governance of rules).
' See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 193-95
(10th ed. 1961) (comparing English idea of legal equality as administered by ordinary courts
to abuses of discretionary authority in continental Europe).
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of the rules with all the care and attention to fairness that is
signaled by ideals such as "natural justice" and "procedural due
process." Thus, if someone is accused of violating one of the general
norms laid down, they should have an opportunity to request a
hearing, make an argument, and confront the evidence before them
prior to the application of any sanction associated with the norm.
The Rule of Law is violated when the institutions that are supposed
to embody these procedural safeguards are undermined. In this way
the Rule of Law has become associated with political ideals such as
the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. 6
For the most part, these two currents of thought sit comfortably
together. They complement each other. Clear, general public norms
are valueless if they are not properly administered, and fair
procedures are no good if the applicable rules keep changing or are
ignored altogether. But there are aspects of the procedural side of
the Rule of Law that are in some tension with the ideal of formal
predictability. The procedural side of the Rule of Law presents a
mode of governance that allows people a voice, a way of intervening
on their own behalf in confrontations with power. It requires that
public institutions sponsor and facilitate reasoned argument in
human affairs. But argument can be unsettling, and the procedures
we cherish often have the effect of undermining the predictability
that is emphasized in the formal side of the ideal.'7 By emphasizing
the legal process rather than the formal attributes of the
determinate norms that are supposed to emerge from that process,
the procedural aspects of the Rule of Law seem to place a premium
on values that are somewhat different from those emphasized in the
formal picture.'" Instead of the certainty that makes private
16 See Helaine M. Barnett, Justice for All: Are We Fulfilling the Pledge?, 41 IDAHO L.
REv. 403, 405 (2005) ("What distinguishes our government in large part is the separation of
powers [and] .... an independent judiciary that ensures our adherence to the [Riule of
[Llaw.").
17 See RONALDDwORKIN, TAKINGRIGHTs SERIOUSLY 186-205 (1977) (arguingthat rights
of subjects are only truly recognized by government which allows occasional protests of its
laws); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate, in DwORKIN AND HIS
CRITIcs 319-36 (Justine Burley ed., 2004) (discussing argumentative aspect of Dworkin's
conception of Rule of Law).
"s See Richard Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1997) (listing "Legal Process conceptions" of Rule of Law alongside
[Vol. 43:1
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freedom possible, the procedural aspects of the Rule of Law seem to
value opportunities for active engagement in the administration of
public affairs. On both sides, the Rule of Law condemns official
behavior that treats individual agency as something of no
consequence. On one side it is private agency in civil society that is
respected, while on the other side it is private agency exercised
within the context of the institutions of the state.
If you were to ask which current of thought is more influential in
legal philosophy, most scholars would say it is the one that is
organized around predictability and the determinacy of legal norms,
rather than the procedural current.'" It has received a great deal of
attention in connection with Lon Fuller's argument in The Morality
of Law.2 ° But it is quite striking that in the popular and political
deployments of the Rule of Law, of which I gave a few examples at
the beginning of this Essay, it is the procedural current that tends
to be emphasized.2' When people say, for example, that the Rule of
Law is threatened on the streets of Islamabad or in the cages at
Guantnamo, it is the procedural elements they have in mind, much
more than the traditional virtues of clarity, prospectivity,
determinacy, and knowing where you stand. They are worried
about the independence of the Pakistani courts and about the due
process rights of detainees in the war on terror. I will come back to
this disparity between what legal philosophers emphasize and what
ordinary people expect from the Rule of Law several times in what
follows. But the main point of this Part has been to identify these
two currents in the Rule of Law tradition and to understand both
how they work together and the tensions that exist between them.
other conceptions).
"9 See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminancy Made in America: U.S. Legal
Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517,522 (2006) (discussing ordering function
of rules and requirements of formal Rule of Law).
' See Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule ofLaw as an Enabling and
Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 513, 535 (noting that World Bank has
adopted Fuller's understanding of function of law).
21 See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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III. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONCEPr OF LAW
Suppose for a moment that the Rule of Law does represent a
more or less coherent political ideal. How central should this be to
our understanding of law itself? What is the relation between the
Rule of Law and the specialist work that modern analytic
philosophers devote to the concept of law, and to the precise
delineation of legal judgment from moral judgment and legal
validity from moral truth?
Grammar suggests that we need to understand the concept of law
before we can understand the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law is a
complex phrase, and the word law is only one of its components.
Just as we cannot understand a phrase like the protection of human
rights unless we understand the smaller component phrase human
rights, so it might appear that we cannot understand the meaning
of the Rule of Law unless we already grasp the concept of law. But
I disagree. I think the surface grammar here is misleading and that
we cannot really grasp the concept of law without at the same time
understanding the values comprised in the Rule of Law. I do not
mean to say that we must understand the concept of the Rule of
Law first, and then go on to conceptualize law itself in a way that is
derivative from that understanding. Instead, I think we should
understand these terms as a package, rather than understanding
one as a separable component of the other. It is, after all, an
accident of usage that the particular phrase the Rule of Law is used
for this ideal. Some theorists use the term legality or principles of
legality instead,22 and there is no grammatical or logical difficulty
in supposing that law and legality need to be understood together,
rather than law being understood first and legality second.
This issue about the priority of conceptual understanding is not
just verbal. Joseph Raz offers a substantive version of the claim
22 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Philosophy of Law, Problems of, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 264, 273-74 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) ("The requirements that the law ...
should be general...; should be free from contradictions, ambiguities, and obscurities; should
be publicly promulgated and easily accessible; and should not be retrospective in operation
are usually referred to as the principles of legality.").
[Vol. 43:1
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that law must be understood first.23 In a 1979 essay, he argues that
the Rule of Law is intended to correct dangers of abuse that arise
from law as such:
The law inevitably creates a great danger of arbitrary
power-the [RIule of [LIaw is designed to minimize the
danger created by the law itself.... Thus the [Rlule of
[L]aw is a negative virtue... the evil which is avoided
is evil which could only have been caused by the law
itself.24
This implies that before you even get to the Rule of Law, you must
understand what law is and the dangers to which it gives rise. I
think Raz is wrong about this. The Rule of Law is an ideal designed
to correct dangers of abuse that arise in general when political
power is exercised, not dangers of abuse that arise from law in
particular. Indeed, the Rule of Law aims to correct abuses of power
by insisting on a particular mode of the exercise of political power:
governance through law. That mode of governance is thought more
apt to protect us against abuse than, say, managerial governance or
rule by decree. On this account, law itself seems to be prescribed as
the remedy, rather than identified as the problem that a separate
ideal-the Rule of Law-seeks to remedy.
There is a broader version of the claim that an understanding of
the Rule of Law presupposes an understanding of law. It has to do
with the priority of what Jeremy Bentham called "expository
jurisprudence" over what he termed censorial jurisprudence."25 It
is said that if we do not maintain a bright line between expository
and censorial jurisprudence, then our legal exposition will be
contaminated by moralistic or wishful thinking and our moral
evaluations will be confounded by a sense that nothing wicked can
23 See JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 214 (1979) (explaining values that are served by Rule of Law).
24 Id. at 224.
2 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 293-94 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789)
(differentiating between expository jurisprudence-ascertaining what law is-and censorial
jurisprudence-ascertaining what law ought to be).
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be law and nothing legal can be wicked.26 On this account, the Rule
of Law should be placed firmly on the censorial-rather than the
expository-side of this division, since it is undoubtedly an
evaluative ideal. And since philosophical inquiry into the nature of
law is conceived as a conceptual prelude to the expository side, it
follows that the Rule of Law can have little bearing upon that
philosophical inquiry.
What should we make of this argument? It is certainly true that
we need to understand the facts of political life and the reality of the
way in which power is being exercised before we can deploy the Rule
of Law as an evaluative ideal. And we need all the conceptual
apparatus that this descriptive or empirical task presupposes. But
it begs the question to say that the concept of law must be regarded
as part of that descriptive or empirical apparatus, or that we cannot
perform the descriptive or empirical task without it. In my view, to
describe an exercise of power as an instance of lawmaking or law-
application is already to dignify it with a certain character; it is
already to make a certain assessment or evaluation of what has
happened. We look for certain patterns and features that matter to
us when we are looking to characterize something as law. It is not
a term we use to capture, at the most basic descriptive level, the
reality of what is going on. Even in positivist jurisprudence, law is
not a fundamental descriptive category. Calling something law
supervenes on our being able to describe what is happening in other
ways-in terms of practices, habits of obedience, dispositions to
comply, and so on. So on all accounts, there is a layer of description
beneath the level at which we use the term law, a layer of
descriptive inquiry that everyone agrees needs to be conducted
clear-headedly before we can begin the process of evaluation. That
descriptive inquiry gives us the data for our evaluations. On the
positivist account, a category like law is simply a way of sorting that
26 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 210 (2d ed. 1994) (This sense, that there is
something outside the official system... is surely more likely to be kept alive among those
who are accustomed to think that rules of law may be iniquitous, than among those who think
that nothing iniquitous can anywhere have the status of law."). See generally Liam Murphy,
The Political Question of the Concept of Law, in HART'S POSTSCRIrPT: ESSAYS ON THE
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 371, 371-409 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (discussing role
moral and political considerations play in determining what law is).
[Vol. 43:1
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preliminary data before we begin to evaluate it; on the account that
I favor, however, it is a way of beginning the process of evaluation.
This dispute cannot be settled by simply reiterating the claim-with
which everyone agrees-that we need to know the facts before we
can begin evaluating.27
IV. AGAINST CASUAL POSITIVISM
I said at the beginning of this Essay that the Rule of Law-like
democracy-is one of our most prominent political ideals.2" Clearly
there are important connections between the two ideals, and these
might be worth exploring on another occasion. For now, however,
I would like to propose an analogy between the way we use the term
law (particularly in the sense of legal system) and the way we use
the term democracy.
During the Cold War, we did not take seriously the titles that
certain societies gave themselves, such as "German Democratic
Republic" (GDR).29 We knew that the GDR was not a democracy
and we were not fooled by its title. Just because something called
itself a democracy did not mean that it actually was a democracy.
We do not pander to the authoritarians. For us to recognize a
system as a democracy means that the system has to satisfy certain
substantive criteria. For example, it has to be a system that allows
political dissent and organized opposition, and that conducts free
and fair elections-with universal adult suffrage-on a regular
basis.
I believe we should be similarly discriminating about how we use
the term law (in the sense of legal system). Not every system of
command and control that calls itself a legal system is a legal
' For a discussion of the connection between this dispute about whether law is a
descriptive or evaluative term and similar disputes in political science, see Jeremy Waldron,
Legal and Political Philosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 352, 378-81 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
'8 See supra Part I.
' See Jochen A. Frowein, Legal Advice for Foreign Policy in Germany, 23 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 25, 25 (2005) ("The German Democratic Republic, which never had any democratic
legitimacy, existed for roughly forty years.").
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system. We need to scrutinize it a little-to see how it
works-before we bestow this term.
I worry that modern students of jurisprudence-particularly
modem legal positivists-are quite casual about what a system of
governance has to be like in order to earn the appellation "law." If
it calls itself a system of law, they are very reluctant to question
that self-characterization. Even if the starting point is not the self-
characterization of actual systems of governance, however, the legal
positivists' own specifications for what it takes to count as a legal
system are overly generous in my view: basically, any well-
organized system of centralized order using articulate and
identifiable prescriptions and prohibitions counts as law, provided
that elite participants in the system can distinguish prescriptions
and prohibitions coming from the center from other norms that may
be circulating in the society.' ° This is the positivism of H.L.A. Hart
and his modern followers. In this regard, it really is not much
different from the positivism of earlier generations of jurists
stretching back through John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, all the
way to Thomas Hobbes: Law is any system of command with the
power to dominate all other systems of command in a given society,
where the chain of effective command can be traced to a single
politically ascendant source." I call this "casual positivism." On
this account, the regimes of Kim Jong-Il in North Korea and
Saddam Hussein in pre-2003 Iraq are legal systems. I propose that
30 See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 153 (2001) ("[Slocial facts are the
grounds of the criteria of legality.... In the end their existence as criteria of legality in a
given community depends only on their being adopted and practiced by the relevant
officials."); HART, supra note 26, at 116 (describing minimum conditions for existence of legal
system as general obedience to rules of behavior and acceptance of rules of recognition by
officials).
31 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 29 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) (explaining that laws are commands that
proceed from those whom members of society are in habit of obeying); JEREMY BENTHAM, OF
LAWS IN GENERAL 1 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) (defining law as "an assemblage of signs
declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a state") (emphasis omitted);
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 202 (A.P. Martinich ed., Broadview Literary Texts 2002) (1651)
("[T]he law is a command, and a command consisteth in declaration or manifestation of the
will of him that commandeth by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the
same .
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a philosophy of law should be less casual and less accommodating
than this.
Historically, the opponents of casual positivism have presented
us with a richer array of positions. Some classical theorists-like
Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas-argued that a system of rule that
calls itself law may fail to qualify as law because of its injustice.32
That is a substantive critique of casual positivism, and of course it
amounts to a "Natural Law" critique of the positivist position itself.
Other forms of opposition are structural rather than substantive:
I have in mind the body of medieval English theory-culminating in
the work of Sir John Fortescue-distinguishing between political
forms of kingship and royal forms of kingship,3 and the political
philosophy of John Locke, which denied that an absolute monarch
could be said to share a legal system with his unfortunate subjects.34
In the twentieth century, there were theories of this kind that
were formal as well as structural. For example, there was the
jurisprudence of the highly original Bolshevik thinker Evgeny
Pashukanis," who honorably insisted-possibly at the cost of his
life36-that socialist legality was a contradiction in terms and that
it was important to distinguish between law and the sort of social
2 See THOMAS AQUINAS, The Summa of Theology, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS
AND ETHICS 48 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1988) ("A tyrannical law,
since it is not in accordance with reason, is not a law in the strict sense, but rather a
perversion of law."); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, On the Laws, in ONTHE COMMONWEALTH AND
ON THE LAWS 120 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (c. 52 B.C.) ("The most
stupid thing of all ... is to consider all things just which have been ratified by a people's
institutions or laws."); SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 112-13 (Marcus Dods
trans., Modern Library 1950) (426) (comparing kingdoms without justice to great robberies).
33 See JOHN FORTESCUE, In Praise of the Laws of England, in ON THE LAWS AND
GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 1, 17-23 (Shelley Lockwood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)
(c. 1470) (distinguishing royal rule from political rule).
34 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 294 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967) (1690) (questioning whether rule by absolute monarch is distinguishable
from state of war).
35 See generally EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY 47-64
(Chris Arthur ed., Barbara Einhorn trans., Ink Links 1978) (1929) (providing introduction to
Pashukanis's general theory of law).
' See Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian
Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1159 (1949) (noting Pashukanis's mysterious
disappearance); John N. Hazard, Editorial Comment, Pashukanis Is No Traitor, 51 AM. J.
INT'L L. 385, 385-86 (1957) (detailing accusations brought against Pashukanis and his
transformation to "enemy of the people").
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ordering that might characterize the management of an industrial
enterprise or the timetabling of a railroad or the internal workings
of an army.37 Pashukanis warned against using the word law to
refer to a system of social regulation simply on account of its
effectiveness.38 He said that "the attempt to make the idea of
external regulation the fundamental logical element in law leads to
law being equated with a social order established in an
authoritarian manner."39 He believed that law was a particular and
distinctive form of social ordering, organized around the
coordination and empowerment of private, independent agents.4 °
Accordingly, he believed there was no future for law under
communism.4
There is also the work of Lon Fuller, who famously insisted on
distinguishing law as a mode of social ordering from the Nazi model
of rule by terror," as well as from various forms of economicmanagement' and psychiatric manipulation.' In Chapter Two of
37 See PASHUKANIS, supra note 35, at 79 (illustrating differences between technical
regulations and legal norms).
8 See id. (arguing that "the regulation of social relations can assume legal character to
a greater or lesser extent").
3 Id. at 101.
40 See id. at 100-01 ('The legal system differs from every other form of social system
precisely in that it deals with private, isolated subjects .... [and] because it presupposes a
person endowed with rights on the basis of which he actively makes claims.").
41 See id. at 133 ("Only when we have closely examined... the withering away ofprivate-
law aspects of the legal superstructure and, finally, the progressive dissolution of the legal
superstructure itself... shall we be able to say that we have clarified at least one aspect of
the process of building the classless culture of the future."); see also Neil Duxbury, English
Jurisprudence Between Austin and Hart, 91 VA. L. REV. 1, 43 (2005) (noting that Pashukanis's
.proclamations about the future redundancy of law under communism" led to his ultimate
demise).
42 See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 630, 660 (1958) ("To me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which
clothes itself with a tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the morality of order, from the
inner morality of law itself, that it ceases to be a legal system. When a system calling itself
law is predicated upon a general disregard by judges of the terms of the laws they purport to
enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even the grossest, by
retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays of terror in the streets, which no one
dares challenge, in order to escape even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of
legality-when all these things have become true of a dictatorship, it is not hard for me, at
least, to deny to it the name of law.").
' See FULLER, supra note 13, at 170-81 (discussing difficulty in discharging tasks of
economic management through adjudicative forms).
" See id. at 38 (suggesting that "people could be made happy without rules").
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The Morality of Law, Fuller entertained his readers with a little
fable about a king-King Rex-who ruled his country incompetently
by issuing decisions and commands that were ad hoc and
inconsistent, secret or unintelligible, retroactive and impracticable,
and changing so constantly that the social environment they defined
was completely unpredictable.45 Do you remember how the fable
ends? His subjects' constant complaints about these defects in
governance led Rex to an embittered and premature death.4" Fuller
tells us: "The first act of his successor, Rex II, was to announce that
he was taking the powers of government away from the lawyers and
placing them in the hands of psychiatrists and experts in public
relations."47 Should we say that Rex II tried a different kind of law?
No: I think we are supposed to infer that Rex II tilted away from
lawmaking and the legal enterprise altogether. Henceforth, his
subjects would be manipulated, treated, and ordered about in a way
that would not involve the distinctive techniques, skills, and
constraints of law. In Chapter Four, Fuller considers a number of
trends in social control in modern societies that remind us of his
fantasy about Rex II's regime.4" He mentions the contemporary
American narcotics control regime and alludes to the increasing use
of actuarial techniques to regulate social intervention in the lives of
ordinary people.49 He also argues that to the extent that methods
of social control such as therapy, conditioning, and psychological
manipulation of deviants become standard, we will not just have
changed the laws or amended our procedures; rather we will have
abandoned the idea of a legal order because it will have come to
seem archaic and troublesome-just as it seemed to Rex I.50
Fuller's concerns about nonlegal modes of governance are
associated by many legal philosophers with his particular
' See id. at 33-38 (providing allegorical account of hypothetical monarch to illustrate
eight ways to fail to govern effectively).
' See id. at 38 ("Rex suddenly died, old before his time and deeply disillusioned with his
subjects.").
47 Id.
" See id. at 163-67 (discussing alternative modes of social control).
49 Id. at 165-66.
'o See id. at 165 ("When, for example, rehabilitation is taken as the exclusive aim of the




characterization of Nazi Germany and his participation in the
debate about whether the Nazis really had or made law.5 His
position was that for the most part they did not.52 From a
jurisprudential point of view, what was wrong in Germany
from 1933 to 1945 was not so much that the Nazis used their power
to advance oppressive and genocidal aims (though of course that is
what matters in the broader scheme of things).53 What was wrong
in terms of law and legality was that they systematically
undermined the formal and procedural conditions associated with
the very existence of a legal system: they used retroactive
directives, rumors of secret decrees, and verbal orders that could
override formal statutes.5 4 They also intimidated judges with a
general requirement that courts not apply any standards or
directives that conflicted with Nazi race ideology-which they
treated as natural law-or with the interests of the party or the
German people.55  Further, they maintained facilities for
concentrating and murdering large numbers of people-facilities
which were free from anything other than industrial constraints.5"
To call this a system of law would make a mockery of the term,
according to Fuller.57 Rule by this sort of terror is not rule by law,
and we need to make sure that our concept of law is not such as to
preclude us from making that point. I believe that this claim by
Fuller needs to be confronted whether or not we also agree with his
further claim that a genuine system of law is less likely to engage
in Nazi-style wrongdoing than any other system of governance."
51 See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2019-20 (1997) (discussing Hart-Fuller debate and
Fuller's view that immoral laws should not retain legal force).
52 See Fuller, supra note 42, at 633 (criticizing Hart's view that legal system under Nazi
Germany qualified as law "in a sense that would make meaningful the ideal of fidelity to
law").
3 See id. at 650 (criticizing assumption that "the only difference between Nazi law
and ... English law is that the Nazis used their laws to achieve ends that are odious to an
Englishman").
54 Id. at 650-52.
' See id. at 652 ("Mhe Nazi-dominated courts were always ready to disregard any
statute, even those enacted by the Nazis themselves, if this suited their convenience. . .
l6 Id.
57 See id. at 660 (criticizing Nazi Germany's legal system).
58 See id. at 636 ("[C]oherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and
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I mentioned the Rex II example, however, to indicate that Fuller
pursued his distinction between legal and nonlegal modes of rule on
a much wider front than was necessary to sustain his points about
the extreme regime maintained in Germany by the Nazis. Placing
the powers of government in the hands of psychiatrists and public
relations experts is different from Nazi-style terror, both morally
and formally. Fuller is prepared to accept that in some regards, it
may even be desirable;59 even where it is desirable, however, he still
wants to say it is not rule by law.6 °
There are features of Pashukanis's jurisprudence and of Fuller's
jurisprudence that make them unattractive to many modern legal
philosophers: Pashukanis' Marxism, of course, and Fuller's
overstated claims about the connection between "the internal
morality of law" and substantive justice.6 But they are both right
about the need to overcome casual positivism-to keep faith with a
richer and more discriminating notion of law.
V. THE ESSENCE OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
So how do we escape from casual positivism? Let me return to
my democracy analogy. We should not call a system of governance
a democracy if it does not regularly hold free elections to determine
who occupies the highest political offices. Is there an equivalent for
law? In other words, are there institutions or practices whose
absence would decisively disqualify a system of rule from being
regarded as a legal system, in the way that the absence of regular
and free elections would decisively disqualify a system of governance
from being regarded as a democracy?
evil.... [Wihen men are compelled to explain and justify their decisions, the effect will
generally be to pull those decisions toward goodness. .. ").
9 Cf. FULLER, supra note 13, at 166 ("There is much reason to believe that our approach
to the problem of drug addiction is wrong, and that more would be achieved through medical
and rehabilitative measures than through the criminal law.").
60 See id. at 163 (arguing that practices which deny that citizens are responsible, self-
determining centers of action cannot be rule by law).




I am going to make a number of suggestions about the
elementary requirements for a system of rule to qualify as a legal
system. You may be irritated by how obvious my suggestions are,
but I hope you will redirect some of that irritation towards the
philosophical theories of law-particularly positivist theories-that
largely ignore or downplay these elements in contemporary
jurisprudence.
A. COURTS
First and foremost, I do not think we should regard something as
a legal system absent the existence and operation of the sort of
institutions we call courts. By courts, I mean institutions that apply
norms and directives established in the name of the whole society
to individual cases, that settle disputes about the application of
those norms, and that do so through the medium of
hearings-formal events that are tightly structured to enable an
impartial body to fairly and effectively determine the rights and
responsibilities of particular persons after hearing evidence and
argument from both sides.62
It is remarkable how little there is about courts in the conceptual
accounts of law presented in modern positivist jurisprudence. The
leading source is H.L.A. Hart's magisterial work, The Concept of
Law.63 Hart conceives of law in terms of the union of primary rules
of conduct and secondary rules that govern the way in which the
primary rules are made, changed, applied, and enforced.' He
certainly seems to regard something like courts as essential; when
he introduces the concept of secondary rules, he talks of the
emergence of "rules of adjudication" in the transition from a pre-
legal to a legal society65 -"secondary rules empowering individuals
to make authoritative determinations of the question whether, on
2 See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A CoMPARATIvE AND PoicAL ANALYsIs 1-64
(1981) (defining prototypical court according to triad structure); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 363-81 (1978) (discussing purposes and forms of
adjudication and important requisites of courts).
6 HART, supra note 26.
" See id. at 81, 94-99 (characterizing law as union of primary and secondary rules).
r Id. at 97.
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a particular occasion, a primary rule has been broken."6 But this
defines the relevant institutions simply in terms of their output
function-the making of "authoritative determinations of the
question whether... a primary rule has been broken." 7 There is
nothing on the distinctive process by which this function is
performed." A Star Chamber ex parte proceeding-without any
sort of hearing-would satisfy Hart's definition, as would the
tribunals we call "kangaroo courts"69 in the antipodes, and as would
a Minister of Police rubber-stamping a secret decision to have
someone executed for violating a decree.
Much the same is true of Joseph Raz's view about the importance
of what he calls "primary norm-applying organs" in Practical Reason
and Norms.7 ° Raz believes that norm-applying institutions are key
to our understanding of legal systems, much more so than
legislatures.71 There are all sorts of institutionalized ways in which
norms may be applied, according to Raz, but "primary norm-
applying organ[s]" are of particular interest.72 Raz describes their
operation as follows: "They are institutions with power to determine
the normative situation of specified individuals, which [institutions]
are required to exercise these powers by applying existing norms,
but whose decisions are binding even when wrong."73 He tells us
that "[clourts, tribunals and other judicial bodies are the most
6 Id. at 96.
67 id.
6 Hart acknowledges that secondary rules will define processes for these institutions.
Id. at 97. But he seems to think that this can vary from society to society and that nothing
in the concept of law constrains that definition. See id. (discussing role of rules of
adjudication).
6 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 382 (8th ed. 2004) ("A self-appointed tribunal or mock
court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied.").
70 See JOSEPH RAz, PRACTIcAL REASON AND NORMS 136 (Princeton Univ. Press 1990)
(1975) ("[Plrimary norm-applying organ [s] .... are institutions with power to determine the
normative situation of specified individuals, which are required to exercise these powers by
applying existing norms, but whose decisions are binding even when wrong.").
71 See id. at 132 ("Norm-applying institutions and not norm-creating institutions provide
the key to our notion of an institutionalized system.").
72 See id. at 134 (describing different kinds of norm-applying institutions and arguing
that primary norm-applying organs are "crucial to our understanding of institutionalized
systems").
73 Id. at 136.
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important example[s] of primary organs." 4  In his abstract
philosophical account, however, the operation of primary norm-
applying institutions is understood solely in terms of output (and in
terms of what is done with their output).,5 Again, there is nothing
about mode of operation or procedure. Secret military commissions
might meet to "determine the normative situation of specified
individuals ... by applying existing norms," 6 in the absence of the
individuals in question and without affording any sort of hearing.
The impression one gets from Raz's account is that a system of rule
dominated by institutions like that would count as a legal system.
Of course, Raz would criticize such institutions, and he might use
the ideal of the Rule of Law to do so: in his writing on that subject,
he suggests that requirements of "[o] pen and fair hearing, absence
of bias, and the like are obviously essential for the correct
application of the law and thus ... to its ability to guide action." 7
But he seems to suggest that this is relevant to law only at an
evaluative level, rather than at the conceptual level.
There is a considerable divergence here between what these
philosophers say about the concept of law and how the term is
ordinarily used. Most people, I think, would regard hearings and
impartial proceedings-and the accompanying safeguards-as an
essential rather than a contingent feature of the institutional
arrangements we call legal systems.78 For most people, their
absence would be a disqualifying factor, just as the absence of free
and fair elections would be in an alleged democracy.
I do not want to be too essentialist about details. The nature of
electoral arrangements varies from one democracy to another, 9 and
74 id.
76 See id. (defining primary norm-applying institutions by their ability to make "binding
applicative determinations").
76 id.
77 RAZ, supra note 23, at 217.
78 See, e.g., Jamil Anderlini, Rewards and Risks of a Career in the Legal System, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 24,2008, at 10 (arguing that lax enforcement of existing legislation and
absence of independent judiciary means that "there is no real legal system in the Western
sense in China").
" See Yen-Tu Su, Beyond Nightmare and Hope: Engineering Proportionality in
Presidential Democracies, 30 J. LEGIS. 205, 211 (2004) (noting existence of different types of
elections and electoral rules in democratic regimes).
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equally the nature of hearings and the procedures used differ
between one legal system and another.8 0 But the essential idea is
much more than merely functional-applying norms to individual
cases. It is also partly structural, involving Martin Shapiro's idea
of the triad structure:8' a first party, a second opposing party, and
above them an impartial officer with the authority to make a
determination.82 Most importantly, it is procedural: the operation
of a court involves a way of proceeding that offers to those who are
immediately concerned an opportunity to make submissions and
present evidence, such evidence being presented in an orderly
fashion according to strict rules of relevance and oriented to the
norms whose application is in question. The mode of presentation
may vary, but the existence of such an opportunity does not. Once
presented, the evidence is then made available to be examined and
confronted by the other party in open court. Each party has the
opportunity to present arguments and submissions at the end of this
process and reply to those of the other party. Throughout the
process, both sides are treated respectfully and above all listened to
by a tribunal that is bound to attend to the evidence presented and
respond to the submissions that are made in the reasons that are
given for its eventual decision.83
These are abstract characteristics-and it would be a mistake to
get too concrete given the variety of court-like institutions in the
world-but they are not just arbitrary abstractions. They capture
a deep and important sense associated foundationally with the idea
of a legal system-that law is a mode of governing people that treats
them with respect, as though they had a view of their own to
present on the application of a given norm to their conduct or
situation. Applying a norm to a human individual is not like
deciding what to do about a rabid animal or a dilapidated house. It
' See Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 34 (2002) (noting that procedures vary widely among legal systems).
8' See SHAPIRO, supra note 62, at 1-37 (describing triad structure).
82 See id. at 1 ("[Wihenever two persons come into a conflict that they cannot themselves
solve, one solution appealing to common sense is to call upon a third for assistance in
achieving a resolution.").
' See Fuller, supra note 62, at 387-88 (discussing importance of reasoned opinions).
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involves paying attention to a point of view and respecting the
personality of the entity one is dealing with. None of this is
emphasized in the dominant positivist account; all of it, I submit,
should be regarded as an essential aspect of our working conception
of law.
B. GENERAL PUBLIC NORMS
A second feature is suggested by the way I have characterized
courts. I argued that courts are institutions which apply norms
established in the name of the whole society through the medium of
tightly structured proceedings." It is essential to our
understanding of a legal system that there are such norms and that
they play a central role in the legal system, a role to which almost
all its defining features are oriented. A system of political rule is
not a system of law unless social order is organized around the
existence of identifiable norms issued for the guidance of conduct.
Two things about these norms are particularly important. First,
they are general in character. As such, they form the basis for all
the particular legal orders issued and enforced in the society,
including the particular orders of courts. Some positivists see the
generality of law as a pragmatic matter: Austin observed that "[tIo
frame a system of duties for every individual of the community, [is]
simply impossible: and if it were possible, it [would be] utterly
useless."85 Hart said that "no society could support the number of
officials necessary to secure that every member of the society was
officially and separately informed of every act which he was
required to do."8" But I think the generality of law is not just a
contingent matter-as though a society could in principle be
governed entirely by ad hoc decrees and still be said to have a
system of law. Definitionally, the word law is associated with
general, as opposed to particular, statements: consider its use in
laws of nature or law-like statements in science, or moral law in
" See supra Part V.A.
85 AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 28-29.
86 HART, supra note 26, at 21.
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Kantian ethics.87 Our concept of law in jurisprudence embodies this
meaning and the principles of impersonality and equality that it
conveys.88
Secondly, to play this central role in a legal system, the norms
must be not only general but public. They must be promulgated to
the public-those whose conduct will be assessed by them and those
whose interests their application is supposed to affect. The public
existence of such norms is to be contrasted with a situation where
there are no abiding points of reference in one's relations with state
authorities, where significant portions of the population are kept in
the dark as to what is expected of them, and where the
tribunals-whose job it is to resolve particular disputes-apply
secret directives that are neither known to nor knowable by the non-
state parties affected. Such a system of secret norms is not a legal
system, for it lacks the dimension of publicity that most people
associate with law.
The identifiability of law is one of the leading themes of modern
positivism.89 The idea of a rule of recognition-a way of determining
whether a given norm has the status of law-is crucial to positivist
jurisprudence, but this tradition has not emphasized public
identifiability. 90 Modern positivists follow H.L.A. Hart in basing the
identification of norms as law on the existence of an accepted rule
of recognition practiced among the elite members of the society,
notably the judges.9' Hart asserts that in a modern system of
government, "a great proportion of ordinary citizens-perhaps a
majority-[will] have no general conception of the legal structure or
of its criteria of validity."92 Hart acknowledges that such a
87 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1797) (emphasizing universality of moral laws).
" For the best account, see HAYEK, supra note 12, at 148-56 (contrasting general and
abstract nature of rules we call "laws" with specific and particular commands).
' See W.J. Waluchow, The Many Faces of Legal Positivism, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 387,388
(1998) (associating Hart's "rule of recognition" with modern positivisim).
o For an understanding of the legal positivist's conception of "the rule of recognition,"
see HART, supra note 26, at 94-95.
"' See Anthony J. Sebock, Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1539,1553-54 (1997) (noting that most modern positivists believe that only community's
legal officials need accept "rule of recognition").
92 HART, supra note 26, at 114. See generally Jeremy Waldron, All We Like Sheep, 12
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conception is consistent with the regime of secret rules that I
mentioned earlier.93 Again, I think Hart is wrong about this. It is
a mistake to think that a system of rule could be a legal system if
there is no publicly accessible way of identifying the general norms
that are supposed to govern people's behavior. I do not mean that
a legal system may be said to exist only when knowledge of the law
and how to find it is disseminated in detail among every last
member of the community. The norms should be public knowledge
in the sense of being available to anyone who is sufficiently
interested, and available in particular to those who make a
profession of being public norm-detectors (lawyers, as we call them)
and who make that expertise available to anyone who is willing to
pay for it. More generally, the public character of law is a matter of
the abiding presence of certain norms in a given society. They
present themselves as public standing norms-settled and
calculable features of the social landscape-not necessarily immune
from change, but not expected to have ephemeral half-lives that
would make it not worth anyone's while to figure out what they are
and what they require.
The publicity of these norms is not just a matter of pragmatic
administrative convenience along the lines of its being easier to
govern people if they know what is expected of them. It embodies
a fundamental point about the way in which the systems we call
"legal systems" operate. They operate by using, rather than
suppressing and short-circuiting, the responsible agency of ordinary
human individuals. Ruling by law is quite different from herding
cows with a cattle prod or directing a flock of sheep with a dog. It
is also quite different from eliciting a reflex recoil with a scream of
command. The publicity and generality of law look to what Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks called "self application," that is, to people's
capacities for practical understanding, for self-control, and for the
self-monitoring and modulation of their own behavior, in relation to
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 169 (1999) (arguing that Hart's version of legal system where
only officials accept and use system's criteria of legal validity is real possibility).
" See HART, supra note 26, at 202 (warning that means of control that are characteristic
of law also facilitate repressive rule); supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
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norms that they can grasp and understand.94 Even when the self-
application of general norms is not possible and institutional
determination is necessary, either because of disputes about
application or because application inherently requires an official
determination, the particular orders that are eventually issued still
look towards self-application. Unsuccessful defendants in private
law litigation are expected to pay the decreed damages themselves;
rare is the case where bailiffs have to turn up and take away their
property.95 I do not mean to deny the ultimately coercive character
of law. But even in criminal cases-where the coercive element is
front and center-it is often the case that a date is set for a convict
to report to prison of his own volition.96 Of course, if he does not
turn up, he will be hunted down and seized. Still, the law strains as
far as possible to look for ways of enabling voluntary application of
its general norms and many of its particular decrees.
I believe this pervasive emphasis on self-application is definitive
of law and that law is therefore sharply distinct from a system of
rule that works primarily by manipulating, terrorizing, or
galvanizing behavior.97 Lon Fuller has argued that this emphasis
embodies law's respect for human agency: "To embark on the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules
involves.., a commitment to the view that man is, or can become,
a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules,
' See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKINGAND APPLICATION OF LAW 120-21 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) ('[Elvery directive arrangement which is susceptible of correct and dispositive
application by a person to whom it is initially addressed is self-applying.... Overwhelmingly,
the greater part of the general body of the law is self-applying, including almost the whole of
the law of contracts, torts, property, crimes, and the like.").
' See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001
U. Cm. LEGAL F. 215, 258 (2001) ("Most people pay civil judgments .... voluntarily because
they know that coercive enforcement is a realistic possibility.").
' Cf id. (arguing that anticipation of coercive enforcement leads to voluntary
compliance).
9 Joseph Raz has pursued the idea of law's action-guiding character in this connection
most thoroughly. See RAZ, supra note 23, at 214 ("[I]f the law is to be obeyed it must be
capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects. It must be such that they can find out what
it is and act on it. This is the basic intuition from which the doctrine of the [Riule of [Liaw




and answerable for his defaults.""8 Many positivists would agree
with him; they accept that law's function is to guide action.99 But
they do not make the connection between this function and the
definitive feature of publicity that I have emphasized. For example,
Jules Coleman takes pains to argue that the action-guiding function
of law is not necessarily expressive of a dignitarian value. °0 In my
opinion, Coleman's view on this is motivated more by a dogmatic
desire to resist any connection between the concept of law and
substantive values like dignity than by any real insight into the
distinctiveness of an action-guiding rather than a purely behavior-
eliciting model of social control. I believe that the action-guiding
character of law-with its emphasis on self-application and its
reliance on agency and voluntary self-control-furnishes a second
dignitarian theme in our understanding of law. At the end of my
discussion of courts, I suggested that law is a mode of governance
that deals with people on the basis that they have a view of their
own to present on the application of the norm to their situation; it
respects their dignity as beings capable of explaining themselves.' 0 '
We can now complement that with the idea that law is inherently
respectful of persons as agents; it respects the dignity of voluntary
action and rational self-control.
C. POSITIVITY
General norms of the kind that I have been talking about are
often associated with the existence and operation of something like
a legislature. The legal norms that govern our actions are not just
discovered; they are man-made. Of course, legislation is not the
98 FULLER, supra note 13, at 162.
99 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 30, at 206 (ascribing to law function of guiding conduct);
HART, supra note 26, at 206-07 (arguing that rules of law consist primarily of general
standards of conduct).
100 Coleman insists that we can talk about the connection between the concept of law and
the guidance of action and what action-guidance involves without pursuing or invoking these
moral ideals. See COLEMAN, supra note 30, at 203-04 (criticizing Stephen Perry, The
Varieties of Legal Positivism, 9 CAN. J.L. JURISPRUDENCE 361 (1996)). On the other hand,
Coleman also associates the distinctiveness of law in this regard with the weak
commendatory aspect of the predicate "law." Id. at 190.
101 See supra Part V.A.
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only way in which laws are made and changed. International law
emerges by treaty and custom, 1 2 and in municipal legal systems,
courts often play a major role in the development and growth of the
law. 10 3 Courts, however, perform their law-making function non-
transparently-under cover of a pretense that the law is being
discovered, not made or changed-and through processes that are
not organized as legitimate law-making processes.0 4 Legislation, by
contrast, conveys the idea of making or changing law explicitly, in
an institution and through a process publicly dedicated to that
task.' °5
Modern legislatures are set up as large representative
assemblies. Ideally, they are established on a democratic basis and
they are organized in a way that is supposed to ensure that they are
responsive to as many interests and opinions as possible. It is
probably a mistake to identify these features of legislation as
definitive of our modern concept of law, though some political
theorists have done so.'0 6 At the other extreme, at least one
theorist, Joseph Raz, has maintained that legislatures are not
essential to a system of law.0 7 But this turns out to mean only that
Raz can imagine something like a legal system operating without a
legislature, though he cannot point to any actual example of this.
This possibility is similar to his suggestion that the imagination
"o See Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 4, 11 (1995) (describing treaties and custom as major sources of international law).
103 See Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the
Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZOJ. CONFLICT RESOL. 267,275 (2008) (noting role of courts
in development of public law).
1"4 See Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH 15,22
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) ("Although the lawmaking role of the courts
is well known to legal professionals, judicial decision making does not present itself in public
as a process for changing or creating law.... Courts are not set up in a way that is calculated
to make lawmaking legitimate.").
105 Id.
"06 See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 81-82 (Maurice Cranston
trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762) ("[Wlhen the people as a whole makes rules for the people
as a whole, it is dealing only with itself; and if any relationship emerges, it is between the
entire body seen from one perspective and the same entire body seen from another, without
any division whatever. Here the matter concerning which a rule is made is as general as the
will which makes it. And this is the kind of act which I call a law .... [Law unites
universality of will with universality of the field of legislation .... ").
" See RAZ, supra note 70, at 129-31 (suggesting that norm-applying institutions-such
as courts-are more important than norm-creating organs).
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
need not balk at the idea of a legal system without sanctions.' 8 In
the real world, sanctions and the deliberate and public activity of
legislatures are both definitive features of law. Their
prominence-respectively, among the grounds of compliance and the
basis of legal change-may vary from system to system, but their
presence is indispensable to the ordinary notion of law.
The existence of such public law-producing processes reminds us
of law's positivity, of its being something that people have made and
people can control. Law is a man-made institution, and its central
norms are human artifacts. True, we talk readily enough of divine
law-God's law-so there are senses of the word law which do not
have this connotation of being man-made. °9 But when we think of
law as a mode of governance, we think of it as something humans
have set up-sometimes using the image of the deliberate actions of
a founding generation, sometimes using the image of the accretion
of customs and practices over generations. To understand law in
this way is not to beg any questions against natural law
jurisprudence. Jurists in the natural law tradition do not deny the
positivity of human law; indeed, they often talk about it much more
sensibly than self-styled positivists. The distinctiveness of their
position consists of a particular view about the relation between
God's law and human law or between the moral law and human
law-not in any denial of the positivity of human law.
Positivity is partly a matter of what law is: it is human, it is
contingent, it is the product of historical processes. But it is also a
matter of how people understand it. Those who are ruled by law
understand that they are ruled in an order that is susceptible to
change and modification. The norms by which they are ruled could
be otherwise. It is only our decision to have them and keep them as
a basis of governance that explains why these norms are law and not
some others. (Once again, the idea of legislation conveys this most
10" See id. at 158-61 (suggesting that legal system which does not provide for sanctions
is logically possible, though humanly impossible).
10* Just to complicate matters, we sometimes distinguish between divine positive law and
other parts of God's law that are supposed to be discernible by reason. Positive can
sometimes just mean made (even made by God) rather than specifically man-made. See
AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 38-39 (discussing divine laws as positive law).
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explicitly.) The idea of law, therefore, conveys an elementary sense
of freedom, a sense that we are free to have whatever laws we like.
Of course, the we in that sentence does not mean that any one of us
is free to have whatever laws he or she likes, nor does it necessarily
imply any idea of democratic control. The we is bound up with
whatever system of human power is in place in a given community.
Still, law's positivity underwrites the use of imagination and
creative thought in regard to law: the norms we are governed by
could be different. A demand that the law should be different may
be impracticable from a political point of view, but it is not
inherently futile (as it would be in the case of the laws of nature).
D. ORIENTATION TO THE PUBLIC GOOD
I have mentioned a number of regards in which law is essentially
public.11° It is made known to members of the public as a basis on
which they may organize their expectations, and it is made,
changed, and administered in the public proceedings of institutions
like courts and legislatures. There is also an additional sense of
publicness relating to the way in which law is oriented to the good
that it serves.
We recognize as law not just any commands that happen to be
issued by the powerful, but norms that purport to stand in the name
of the whole society and to address matters of concern to the society
as such. We recognize institutions as part of a legal system when
they orient themselves in their public presence to the good of the
community-in other words, to issues of justice and the common
good that transcend the self-interest of the powerful. It strains our
ordinary concept of law to apply it to norms that address matters of
personal or partial concern, or to institutions that make no pretense
to operate in the name of the whole community, presenting
themselves as oriented instead to the benefit of the individuals who
control them.
That law presents itself in a certain way-as standing in the
name of the public and as oriented to the public good-seems to me
... See supra Part V.B.
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to be one of its defining characteristics. I do not mean that nothing
counts as law unless it actually promotes the public good. Jurists
used to ask-in the vein of Saint Augustine-"What is the difference
between a system of laws and a set of commands issued by a band
of robbers?""' One answer might be that the robbers' commands do
not promote the public good; they are simply for the advantage of
the robber band. That is something like a strong natural law
position, however, and it is not what I am suggesting here.
Positivist answers to Augustine's question have tended to revolve
around issues of effective institutionalization: the order constituted
by the power of the robbers would not be effective enough nor be
sufficiently institutionalized to call for the use of the concept of law
in all its complexity."2 There might be an intermediate position,
however. Instead of saying that nothing is law unless it promotes
the public good, we might say that nothing is law unless itpurports
to promote the public good, i.e., unless it presents itself as oriented
in that direction." 3 This is an aspirational or orientational idea, not
a substantive one. But it is nevertheless very significant.
E. SYSTEMATICITY
The fifth feature of law that I want to mention is much harder to
label than the others. I call it "systematicity," though it is
predicated on another closely related feature, which may be called
the "cumulative" character of law.
A legal system builds on itself. Though it is always possible for
a law to be amended or revoked, it is not usual for each new
legislature to wipe the slate clean of the work of its predecessors.
Instead, what legislators do-and what courts also do in their law-
... See AUGUSTINE, supra note 32, at 112-13 (comparing kingdoms withoutjustice to great
robberies).
112 Cf HANS KEISEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 47 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of California
Press 1967) (1934) ("Why is the coercive order that constitutes the community of the robber
gang... not interpreted as a legal order?... Because no basic norm is presupposed according
to which one ought to behave in conformity with this order. But why is no such basic norm
presupposed? Because this order does not have the lasting effectiveness without which no
basic norm is presupposed.").
11 Cf Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 759, 761 (2001)
(exploring similar suggestion about relation between law and justice).
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making capacity-is add to the laws already in existence. That is
what I mean by law's cumulative effect. Even when there is a
radical change of personnel in the political system-with liberals
replacing conservatives-indeed, even when there is a revolution,
we hardly ever see a return to "Year Zero" so far as the law is
concerned. Instead, law grows by accretion, so that new liberal
legislation takes its place alongside old conservative legislation--or
at least alongside the old conservative legislation that has not been
explicitly repealed.
On the other hand, a legal system is not just a succession of
legislated norms-like the common view of history in Toynbee's
phrase, just "one damned thing after another.""4 On the simplest
command model, particular laws come into existence by virtue of
particular commands. The strongman in charge of a society issues
one command; the next day he issues another command; and so on,
until there is a whole heap of commands. On the crudest positivist
understanding, that is what the law of the society amounts to-a
heap of commands-whether or not anyone can make sense of them
all together. But I do not think we would call that a legal system,
or regard the unrelated and unreconciled heap of commands as a
system of laws, if it was not thought appropriate to try to introduce
some organizing system into the accumulation." 5  Legal norms
present themselves as fitting or aspiring to fit together into a
system, each new ruling and each newly-issued norm taking its
place in an organized body of law that is fathomable by human
intelligence. Positivists like Raz have emphasized law's coherence
as an institutional system." 6  Law is not only a system in an
institutional sense, however, but in a sense relating to logic,
coherence, and perhaps even what Ronald Dworkin has called
"integrity."" 7 At its most modest, this feature of systematicity
114 ARNoLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 265 (1957).
"' See Jeremy Waldron, "Transcendental Nonsense" and System in the Law, 100 COLUM.
L. REV 16, 31-32 (2000) (criticizing legal positivists for ignoring the importance of
systematicity of laws in legal systems).
"" See generally RAZ, supra note 70, at 123-48 (analyzing importance of norm-applying
and norm-creating institutions to normative systems).
117 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 165-66 (1986) (defining "political integrity" as
government acting in principled and coherent manner toward all citizens).
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amounts to something like Lon Fuller's requirement of consistency:
people must not be confronted by the law with contradictory
demands-for example, with rules that require and prohibit the
same conduct at the same time and in the same circumstances.
118
Legal systems satisfy this demand with the use of maxims like lex
posterior derogat priori."' Beyond that, there is a felt requirement
essential to law that its norms make some sort of sense in relation
to one another; even apart from formal consistency, we should
interpret them so that the point of one does not defeat the point of
another. That is why the use of analogy is appropriate in legal
argument; it builds on a sense that individual norms are not self-
contained and that the point of any one of them may have some
bearing on how it is appropriate to think about any other. This
broader sense of the systematicity of law helps explain why we think
of a body of law as consisting of not just legislation and decisions in
particular cases, but also principles whose content reflects powerful
themes that run implicitly through the whole body of law and that
are reflected in various ways in its explicit norms. 20 The principles
of a legal system are not part of its enacted law or its formal
holdings, but they represent the underlying coherence of its enacted
laws and its formal holdings.
The making of law is often thought of as embodying a principle
of will rather than reason. In the legislative process, something
becomes law for no other reason than that someone wills it to be
SO.121 But legislation is not just the addition of a rule to the heap of
laws; it is a modification of the corpus juris. That is why legislating
is in part a technical task: each bill must be framed in a way that
pays attention to the juridical (as well as the social) environment in
which it is to operate. Also, it is striking the extent to which
particular legislative measures present themselves not just as
... See FULLER, supra note 13, at 65-70 (discussing difficulties of contradictory laws).
19 See BLAcK'S LAWDICTIONARY 931 (8th ed. 2004) ("[A] later law prevails over an earlier
one.").
0 See DwoRKIN, supra note 17, at 22-41 (arguing importance of understanding principles
behind rules as opposed to just rules themselves).
121 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNiTYOF LEGISLATION 11-12 (1999) (describing contrast
between courts-which change laws indirectly, through decision making-and legislatives,
which change laws directly).
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peremptory fiats, but also as small-scale normative systems, with
an array of provisions dealing with interpretation, application,
exceptions and so on. (The extreme case, of course, is legislation
that sets out explicitly to codify a given area of the law.) This
systematicity also affects the way law presents itself publicly.
Finding out what the law is consists of finding out how the
accumulating system of norms has been modified.
Judges like to pretend that they are not making law in the willful
way that legislators make law. Even when their conclusions are
new, they present them as the product of reasoning rather than
will.'22 The systematicity of law helps explain this. The process by
which courts make law involves projecting the existing logic of the
law into an area of uncertainty or controversy, using devices such as
analogy and reference to underlying principles. Courts would have
to operate in quite a different way-and the pretense that they are
really just finding the law rather than laying down new law would
be much harder to sustain-were it not for the systematicity of the
existing body of norms that they manipulate.
Above all, law's systematicity affects the way that law presents
itself to those it governs. It means that law can present itself to its
subjects as a unified enterprise of governance that one can make
sense of. I do not just mean that one can make sense of each
measure, as one might do on the basis of a statement of legislative
purpose. I mean that one can make sense of the "big picture," with
an understanding of how the regulation of one set of activities
relates rationally to the regulation of another. This is another
aspect of law's publicness. The law's susceptibility to rational
analysis is a public resource that members of the public may make
use of-not just for understanding or as an intellectual exercise, but
in argument. In court, for example, the submissions that may be
made on behalf of each party are not limited to a view of the facts
and the citation of some determinate rule. They can also be a
presentation of the way in which the antagonists take their
positions to fit generally into the logic and spirit of the law. In this
'2 Id. at 12.
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way, the law pays respect to those who live under it, conceiving
them now as bearers of individual reason and intelligence.
Again, the theme of dignity is important. Earlier we considered
the way in which law respects the dignity of individual agency by
relying largely upon the self-application of general norms. 123 Now
we see that it also respects the dignity of reasoning and even
argumentativeness. The individuals whose lives law governs are
thinkers who can grasp and grapple with the rationale of that
governance and relate it in complex but intelligible ways to their
own view of the relation between their actions and purposes and the
actions and purposes of the state.
VI. A NARROW CONCEPT OF LAW
I am unsure whether we should say that the five features I have
considered provide the basis of a positivist account of law. The
positivity of law is emphasized in my third feature, but-as I
noted-it is also recognized by jurisprudential theories opposed to
positivism. It is certainly not a purely descriptive account.
2 1
Shortly we will consider the significance of the fact that all five of
these features are, to a greater or lesser extent, value-laden. Even
if they do provide the basis of a positivist account of law, it is no
longer casual positivism of the sort we considered in Part IV. It
defines a distinctive mode of governance that is worth having and
worth distinguishing from other modes of governance.
The mode of governance that is properly called law is quite
common in the world today, but we should not infer from this that
just any mode of governance necessarily conforms to it. There have
been and are societies that are not ruled in this way. They may be
the "pre-legal" societies of pure custom without institutions that
'2 See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
12 On the other hand, some positivist theories present the descriptive characteristics that
they regard as definitive of law in a way that is quite explicit about the values that motivate
the choice of these characteristics. See Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism,
in HART'S POSTSCRIpr: ESSAYS ON THE POsTSCRIPr TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 26,
at 411-33 (describing 'normative positivism" as valuing separability of legal judgment and
moral judgment).
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H.L.A. Hart discussed in The Concept of Law.125 They may also be
modern tyrannies or totalitarian societies that do not use any
institutional process recognizably like that of a court and that base
their rule on a haphazard array of secret decrees issued at the whim
of a strongman and known only to the officials charged with
enforcing them. In societies like these it will be regarded as-at
best-a puzzling naivety and-at worst-a fatal insolence to
demand one's day in court, to attempt to present any sort of
reasoned argument about one's own view of one's obligations, or to
insist on knowing in advance and in stable and general terms what
is required of one so that one can organize one's life accordingly.
The commands and decrees imposed in such a society may be
called "laws" and the institutions that administer them may
describe themselves in terms appropriate to a legal system. If
someone wants to insist on these descriptions, we will not be
bewildered; we will understand what is going on. The use of a
concept does not always involve all of its meaning or resonance, and
the use of complex and important concepts is often crude and
peremptory, as people use them roughly to cover anything that they
think is analogous to their proper or central application. 2 ' But
those who use language so loosely should also not be surprised when
others withhold the relevant terms, insisting on a more rigorous and
specific meaning.
This is particularly the case when terms have an important
appraisive or accreditative function. Consider terms like doctorate
or master's degree. When someone says that they have a doctorate
in physics or a master's degree in political science, I think we are
entitled-conceptually-to expect that these terms refer to
accredited qualifications from a proper university, with all the
attributes and orientations that graduate education at a university
involves. It may not be Harvard or Oxford, but we would expect it
to be an institution of a certain kind or character.
125 See HART, supra note 26, at 91-94 (describing conditions that must be satisfied for
primitive communities to function by non-legal, primary rules).
126 See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9-18 (1980)




Yet we know there are dubious institutions that offer "degrees"
on the basis of programs that do not conform to anything
recognizable as advanced university education. Imagine receiving
a spam e-mail that reads: "Too lazy to attend exam or classes? We
have Diplomas and Degrees-Masters' or Doctorates-to choose
from in any field of your interest. Only two weeks required to
deliver the prestigious, non-accredited university's paper to your
doorstep. Do not hesitate to give us a call today! 1-555-693-8861."
In this scenario, the company is not promising to send a Harvard
doctorate in the mail. There is no element of misrepresentation.
Degrees are relative to institutions: some people (after years of
study) can put "Ph.D. (Harvard)" after their name, while others (two
weeks after dialing 1-555-693-8861) can only put down "Ph.D.
(Flybynight U.)." Anyone who orders a degree from this company
knows what the degree will be worth. On the other hand, if I were
insisting that conceptually a doctorate must be a qualification based
on a serious program of advanced study, I do not think that I should
be embarrassed by this e-mail as a counter-example. We all know
what is going on. We know there can be unsophisticated uses of
sophisticated concepts, and we can recognize this example as such.
Certainly it would be a mistake to insist that since this e-mail
represents an intelligible use of the word doctorate, our analysis of
the concept of a doctorate must be relaxed enough to accommodate
it. We can have a more stringent analysis than that, while still
understanding the temptations and conveniences of using doctorate
in this particular way.
The same is true of democracy in the analogy we have been using.
We know what people were getting at when they described the
United States in 1918 as a democracy, even though women were not
guaranteed the right to vote; even apartheid South Africa might
have been called a democracy-on account of universal adult white
suffrage-to distinguish it from countries that were ruled by a king
or a dictator not subject to the votes of ordinary people at all. And
if elections are infrequent or corrupt, we may still understand what
the supporters of a regime are doing when they call it a
"democracy." Even so, our ability to understand any of these uses
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does not mean that a proper account of the concept of democracy
requires that it be extended to cover them.
Similarly, a secret edict issued by a dictator to the effect that the
assets of anyone who fails to display sufficient enthusiasm for the
dictatorship are forfeited to members of the dictator's family can be
called law if you like. We know what someone would mean by
calling it the law of pre-invasion Iraq or wherever. But this usage
need not embarrass us in our account of law's essential features, for
our account is not promising to say what is conveyed by every
intelligible use of the word law. It is an explication of the central
concept of law which needs to be understood in itself as background
to our necessarily more jaundiced understanding of these other
degenerate, exploitative, and backhanded uses of the term.
In The Concept of Law, one of the grounds on which Hart
defended a fairly relaxed-if not a casual-form of positivism was
that any more restrictive use of the term law would not isolate a
distinctive phenomenon worth separate study. "[Niothing is to be
gained," he said, "in the theoretical or scientific study of law as a
social phenomenon by adopting the narrower concept [of law] ."12
Hart argued that any proposal to leave to another discipline the
study of systems that did not satisfy the more restrictive test would
simply invite confusion.12 Note, however, that Hart was not talking
about any of the five characteristics of law that I have mentioned,
but instead about the traditional natural law view that certain
edicts are too wicked to be called laws. And he may have been right
about the idea of separating the "scientific" study of such edicts into
a discipline separate from the study of laws that are just. But I do
not think his argument applies to the case that has been made in
this Essay.
Though there is a discipline devoted to the study of all forms of
political order-namely, political science-a lot can be gained from
defining a subfield that would concentrate on systems of governance
that exhibit the five characteristics I have mentioned. Legal
systems have complexity, and they engage the consciousness and




agency of their subjects in ways that starkly distinguish them from
other forms of rule. They are likely to exhibit patterns of growth
and decline and to generate certain outcomes under certain
conditions that are worth studying as a matter separate from the
patterns of growth and decline and the outcomes under similar
conditions of dictatorships or "pre-legal societies." Just as political
scientists make a study of electoral politics, which is distinct from
forms of study that include, say, Kremlinology, the study of how
legal systems (in my sense) operate in the real world may well
generate a body of research and literature that is not readily
applicable to the behavior of other sorts of political systems where
quite different types of institutions are involved and quite different
modes of interaction and expectation exist between rulers and ruled.
Let me turn now to the evaluative dimension of my account. The
features that I have suggested are definitive of law are formal,
structural, institutional, and procedural in character. They are not
substantive features, though they are not without moral
significance. I think they define something worth treasuring as well
as something worth studying. We have noted various ways in which
these characteristics define a mode of governance that takes people
seriously as dignified and active presences in the world-persons
with lives of their own to lead, with points of view about how their
lives relate to the interests of others, and with reason and
intelligence to exercise in grasping their society's system of order.
I am sure that my defining features can be stated in purely
descriptive terms (if anyone wants them characterized in that way).
But let us be clear: these features are morally motivated
criteria-just as, in our analogy, the insistence on free and fair
elections for a democracy is a morally motivated criterion. When we
say that there cannot be a democracy unless there are elections, it
is because democracy is something that we care about and the idea
of elections goes to the heart of what matters to us. We could
phrase this definitional requirement in purely descriptive terms, but
in doing so, we would sell it short in our account of its importance
and the connection between it and the overall value of democracy.
Similarly, the criteria for law that I have identified--criteria like
courts, with their characteristic modus operandi; governance by
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general norms in a way that respects people's dignity as agents
capable of autonomous self-government; law as representing a way
in which a community takes public control of the conditions of its
collective life; and law's amenability to reason-all of these go to the
heart of what we value about law. They explain in evaluative terms
why the distinction between legal systems and other types of
systems of governance is important to us. Their definitional
connection with law is not just a semantic point; it is a substantive
moral thesis.
Hart addressed this aspect of the matter as well. He worried
that a value-laden definition of law might confuse the issue of
whether people should obey a law that they perceive to be
iniquitous. 129 That issue, he worried, might become equivocally
poised between the judgment that "[tihis is law; but it is too
iniquitous to be applied or obeyed"3 ° and the judgment that "[i]f this
is as iniquitous as I think it is, it would not properly be regarded as
law."'3 ' Hart went on to argue that:
What surely is most needed in order to make men clear-
sighted in confronting the official abuse of power, is that
they should preserve the sense that the certification of
something as legally valid is not conclusive of the
question of obedience, and that, however great the aura
of majesty or authority which the official system may
have, its demands must in the end be submitted to a
moral scrutiny. This sense, that there is something
outside the official system, by reference to which in the
last resort the individual must solve his problems of
obedience, is surely more likely to be kept alive among
those who are accustomed to think that rules of law may
129 See id. at 207-09 (describing problems with laws which are morally iniquitous, yet
properly enacted and clear in meaning).
'30 Id. at 208.
... See id. (describing temptation to make conservative application of natural law position,
to validate all enacted laws as necessarily just, simply on account of their status as law).
20081
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
be iniquitous, than among those who think that nothing
iniquitous can anywhere have the status of law. 132
But plainly this is an argument only against a definition of law
whose implicit values are supposed to clinch the issue of obedience.
It is not an argument against a definition of law whose implicit
values are relevant to, but far from determinative of, the overall
question of obedience. The values that support my account of law's
distinctive features are not the sort of values that can settle what
we should do when faced with an edict that appears unjust or
harmful to the public good. We may ask: Is it at least publicly
presented in a way that is oriented to the public good? Is it
administered through courts with familiar procedural safeguards?
Has it been made available as a basis on which people might
organize their lives, applying it themselves to their own conduct?
Is it administered as part of an intelligible system? The answers to
these questions may affect our overall moral estimate of the
situation, but they still leave the crucial question of obedience
unsettled. Thus, they do not give rise to the concern that Hart
expressed.
Let me return to my democracy analogy to make another point.
Elections in the real world are seldom perfect, even in the
countries-like the United States-that we regard as paradigms of
democracy. Electoral systems are flawed, registration and turnout
are low, systems of recording and counting votes are often chaotic
and vulnerable to manipulation, and so on.'33 "Free and fair
elections" is a matter of degree, and when we call it a defining
feature of democracy, we may have in mind a fairly low threshold
compared with what a perfect system would offer. The same is true
of law: all five criteria that I have mentioned are matters of degree.
A particular directive may be more or less stable, more or less well-
publicized, enforced through more or less scrupulous procedures,
and integrated more or less fully into a coherent system of norms.
I think we call something a legal system if it satisfies a recognizable
132 Id. at 210.
"' Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the CaseAgainst Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,1389
(2006).
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minimum along these five dimensions, at least to the extent that it
pays credible tribute to the concerns that underlie each of the
criteria. We may not have a precise sense of what that minimum is;
there may be gray areas around the threshold that will likely
generate dispute about whether a problematic case qualifies as a
legal system. This is also true of democracy. It means that both the
disciplinary boundaries we are imagining and the morally-motivated
conceptual distinctions that we want to draw in these respective
fields are not crisp, but only blurred and uncertain.
Not only are our defining criteria matters of degree, but they are
matters of degree in several dimensions. One important dimension
not mentioned so far is the extent to which recognizably legal
institutions and requirements actually impact the way society
works. Law is not a game. There might be a set of norms and
institutions that exhibit all of the characteristics I have mentioned
but which apply only to a very small subset of social, economic, and
political interactions and regulate both public and private power to
an inconsiderable extent. I do not think we should call such a
system the legal system of a society if it is confined to an obscure
corner in this way. It is part of our idea of law that, even if it does
not regulate everything, it must be effective in governing many-if
not most-of the more important interactions and conflicts in a
given society. It must apply to the main ways in which ordinary
people and businesses are subjected to and affected by the exercise
of power in society (certainly by the exercise of public power and
maybe by big centers of private power as well). And, it must
effectively control, direct, govern, and-where appropriate-restrain
the exercise of political power in ways that people can count on.1
3 4
13 Modem positivist theories include a condition of efficacy. See, e.g., HART, supra note 26,
at 116-17 (describing minimum conditions necessary for existence of legal system as (1) effective
acceptance of rules as common public standards of official behaviour; and (2) general obedience
of rules by private citizens); KEISEN, supra note 112, at 11-12, 47-48, 211-14 (arguing that
validity of legal norms requires a minimum ofeffectiveness). Such a condition requires only that
such laws as there are be generally complied with or enforced; it does not require that law
extend over any particular domain. Raz suggests that law claims comprehensive competence,
but this is still a separate matter from the extent of its actual reach. Raz, supra
note 70, at 150-51.
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VII. FROM THE CONCEPT OF LAW TO THE RULE OF LAW
I said at the outset that one of my aims in this Essay is to argue
for a closer connection between the idea of law and the idea of the
Rule of Law.'35 Those who are familiar with the Rule of Law will
have noted that what I have called the defining characteristics of
law are also among the most prominent requirements of that ideal.
The requirement I have just mentioned is a version of Lon Fuller's
principle of congruence.136 And of the five defining ideas explored in
Part V, three are intimately connected with Rule-of-Law
requirements: (1) systematicity is associated with the Rule-of-Law
requirement of consistency or integrity;'37 (2) the existence of
general norms is associated with the Rule-of-Law requirements of
generality, publicity, and stability; and (3) the existence of the
distinctive institutions we call courts is associated with the Rule-of-
Law requirement of procedural due process.
Much like the criteria I used for specifying what we mean by law,
the requirements associated with the Rule of Law are all matters of
degree. They are matters of degree because first, a system of
governance may satisfy the Rule of Law in some areas of governance
and not others; second, the Rule of Law comprises multiple
demands, some of which may be satisfied while others are not; and
third a particular norm or directive may be more or less clear, more
or less stable, more or less well-publicized, and enforced through
more or less scrupulous procedures. Moreover, this feature of the
Rule of Law seems essential to the work that it does as a political
ideal. We use it to make nuanced and qualified assessments as well
as all-or-nothing condemnations or commendations of systems of
governance. We do sometimes say that there is a catastrophic
failure of the Rule of Law (like the Nazi Germany of Fuller's
characterization); 138 but mostly we talk about "departures" from the
135 See supra Part I.
136 See FULLER, supra note 13, at 81-91 (describingimportance ofcongruence betweenlaw
and official action).
137 See Jeremy Waldron, Retroactive Law: How Dodgy Was Duynhoven?, 10 OTAGO L.
REV. 631, 653 (2004) (arguing that importance of Rule of Law requirement of prospectivity
is connected to importance of systematicity in law).
138 See FULLER, supra note 13, at 40 (describing Hitler's Germany as "a general and
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Rule of Law, or actions that "undermine" the Rule of Law to a
certain extent, or the "weakening" of the Rule of Law, or we talk of
particular-though not necessarily systemic-violations of the Rule
of Law, and so on.
I believe that one can understand these two sets of criteria-for
the existence of law and for the Rule of Law-as two perspectives on
the same basic idea. The very idea of law is a demanding concept,
and there are two ways of thinking about its demanding-ness. We
can think of the demands as being incorporated into the meaning of
law itself, placing limits on our use of this term. Or we can think of
the demands as being aspirations embodied in an ideal associated
with the operation of a legal system-the Rule of Law. John Finnis
brings the two perspectives together when he says, in his discussion
of the Rule of Law in Natural Law and Natural Rights, that "the
Rule of Law" is "[t]he name commonly given to the state of affairs
in which a legal system is legally in good shape."139 A legal system
can be in better or worse shape, but after a point it can be in such
bad shape that it does not satisfy the criteria for being a legal
system at all.
But even if it is recognizable as a legal system, we may still
demand more from that system on any or all of these dimensions.
The fact that we work with a roughly defined threshold for a system
of governance to count as law does not mean that we rest satisfied
with these minimum credible achievements. There is always room
for improvement, and there is also danger of deterioration. The
criteria I have outlined make themselves available as sources of
continuing normative pressure to reach higher up each scale and to
resist the downward pressure that other exigencies of politics
inevitably generate.
For example, on the issue of courts, there is pressure to improve
procedural due process and to resist the tendency to replace
adjudicative hearings with other types of process. Regarding norms,
there is a continuing campaign against retroactivity, failures of
generality, vagueness, and other vices specified in Lon Fuller's
drastic deterioration in legality").
139 FINNIS, supra note 126, at 270.
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"inner morality of law." 40 With systematicity, there are arguments
for codification and for the promotion of a greater element of what
Ronald Dworkin has called "integrity" in both legislation and
common law.' With the control of power, there may be a
continuing aspiration to bring more and more of the discretion that
characterizes the administrative and welfare state under the control
of legal norms and institutions, particularly the forms of discretion
that impact directly and deleteriously on individuals' lives, liberties,
and property.
These demands can be characterized in a number of ways. If the
problems with a particular system of governance are deep, multi-
faceted, and endemic, we may understand the pressure for
improvement as a demand that the system become a less marginal
case of a legal system-more evidently and less controversially an
example of the operation of law. Using our analogy again, it is like
insisting that elections in Zimbabwe be free and fair, and
uncontaminated by violence, so that the country can be regarded as
a more definite case of a democracy rather than as the degenerate
mixture of democratic forms and rule by fear that it has recently
become.'42 Even if a country is undoubtedly a democracy-such as
the United States--one may still put pressure on its institutions to
be more truly democratic. Whether this pressure is characterized
in terms of the concept of democracy or some aspirational
democratic ideal may be a matter of choice in the way that the
demand is presented. Similarly, a system of governance that is
undoubtedly a legal system may be reproached for occasional lapses
into retroactivity, or for occasional failures to control bureaucratic
power. Such reproaches may be phrased either in terms of the
concept of law-"Let us make this a less marginal example of a legal
system"-or in terms of the Rule of Law--"Let us apply the Rule-
140 See FULLER, supra note 13, at 43 (describing moral aspiration of legislators to make
laws clear and understandable).
141 See DWORKIN, supra note 117, at 176-86 (describing political integrity as principle that
lawmakers try to make laws morally coherent and judges try to make laws adjudicatively
coherent).
142 For a current discussion of the political climate in Zimbabwe, see generally Eliot Tofa
& Moses Tofa, Zimbabwe and Mugabe's Politicization of State and Civic Institutions, 13 GEO.
PUB. POLY REv. 87 (2007).
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of-Law ideal more rigorously to this legal system." In both
phrasings, there is an evaluation and a degree of categorization
going on.
4 3
Usually, a reproach in terms of the concept of law indicates that
we may be in danger of falling short of some minimum threshold,
while a reproach in terms of the Rule of Law represents continuing
upward pressure along each of these defining dimensions. Different
people in various circumstances will use the terms differently, so
there will be ample room for disagreement about whether a given
case should be regarded as a poor example of a legal system, as
opposed to one that does not score as highly on the Rule of Law
requirements as it should. For instance, Jeremy Bentham might
denounce the system of English common law as not really law at
all,'" while more moderate thinkers might say that it is a system of
law-just one where there is massive room for improvement along
Rule-of-Law dimensions. Each side can see what the other is
getting at, however, and each side can understand the looseness in
the use of this common terminology. 45 In addition, the existence of
multiple criteria on both sides-in our definition of law and in our
understanding of the Rule of Law-means that there is even more
room for variation and indeterminacy. This is exactly what we
should expect of a complex evaluative concept. It is what we have
in our analogous case of democracy, and I suggest that it is what we
should also expect for law.
" I do not dissent from Ronald Dworkin's view that law is an interpretive concept. See
DWORKIN, supra note 117, at 87 ("When [judges] disagree ... their disagreements are
interpretive. They disagree, in large measure or in fine detail, about the soundest
interpretation of some pertinent aspect ofjudicial practice."). Rather, what I am trying to do
in this Essay is delineate the shape of the relation between our interpretation of law and our
understanding of the Rule of Law.
1" See BENTHAM, supra note 31, at 193 ("[The [common law] is a fiction from beginning
to end: and it is in the way of fiction if at all that we must speak of it."); see also GERALD J.
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 328-36 (1986) (describing Bentham's
contempt for common law).
'4 Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 117, at 104-08 (taking similarly open approach to old
question of whether Nazi Germany had legal system).
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VIII. DISPUTES ABOUT WHAT THE LAW IS
The word law is sometimes used in the sense of legal system and
sometimes in the sense of legal proposition.'46 In this Essay, I have
focused mostly on law in the sense of legal system. But what about
law in the sense of legal proposition? We say, for example, that it
is the law that you must pay your taxes by April 15. How is this
second usage to be understood in the framework I am proposing?
A crude understanding might relate the two senses of law in the
following way. Law in the first sense requires the existence of
certain general norms that serve as a basis of orientation for
people's behavior, as well as a basis for decision by the courts. That
was our second defining element of law in Part V. Maybe this
second sense of law is just a way of talking about those general
norms: whether something is the law may simply be a matter of
whether it can be found in the array of publicly promulgated general
norms that I mentioned. 147
Unfortunately, this account is too crude, for a couple of reasons.
First, we will want to include among the possible values of the
predicate "__ is the law," not only the identifiable general norms of
the society, but also the particular decisions of courts. Once we do
that, we are bound to feel some pressure to extend it to comprehend
the basis on which courts make their decisions. If the courts seem
to be establishing certain ways of understanding the general norms,
or if the courts seem to be articulating certain principles of decision
that are intermediate between the enacted general norms and the
decision of particular cases, then it may be appropriate to describe
such modes of interpretation and such intermediate principles as
law, too.
Second, the emphasis placed on the systematicity of law and its
penetrability by human reason in Part V may also mean that we
must give the term law a broader extension. Occasionally, counsel
or a judge may argue that people ought to be able to rely on some
law-like proposition, even though that proposition has been neither
148 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
147 See supra Part V.C.
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adopted explicitly in legislative form nor articulated (until that
moment) by a court. We might say nevertheless that since the
proposition can be inferred from existing legal materials that
already carry legal authority, it also should be accorded authority.
It is a distinctive feature of legal systems that they set up
institutions-courts-that are required to listen to submissions
along these lines. These are not just arguments about what the law
ought to be-made, as it were, in a sort of lobbying mode. They are
arguments of reason that maintain competing contentions about
what exactly the law is. Inevitably, the line between
characterization and normativity in these arguments will be
blurred. One party will argue that a particular proposition cannot
be inferred from the law as it is; the other party will respond that it
can be inferred if we just credit the law with more coherence than
people have in the past. Our account of what the law is, then, is not
readily separable from our account of how the law aspires to present
itself. Our response to the pressure for coherence may well alter our
sense of what the law already contains.
It follows from this that the determination of whether something
is law or not may sometimes-perhaps characteristically-be a
matter of doubt and contestation. Such contestation can be
explained by the interaction of some of the features emphasized in
this Essay: The invocation of clear public norms, on the one hand,
and argumentation on the basis of coherence and systematicity, on
the other. Both are practices to which the formalities of the
courtroom are hospitable, and together they explain why people
often disagree about what the law is.
Some lawyers will be troubled by the resulting indeterminacy.
"How," they will ask, "can it be so unclear what the law is?" But the
approach I have indicated here has the descriptive advantage of
explaining the disagreements about law that actually occur in legal
practice. At times, of course, the law is clear. There is no
controversy about the speed limit on Route 316 heading west out of
Athens, Georgia towards Atlanta. But in many other cases the
existence of disagreement about how to establish the truth of some
legal proposition is undeniable. The account given here draws
heavily on the recent work of Ronald Dworkin, who insists that our
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concept of law must be able to make sense of the disagreements we
often have about how to determine what the law on a particular
topic is.'" Moreover, it must be able to explain this disagreement
not just as a jurisprudential puzzlement or pathology, but as a
distinctive aspect of legal practice. 149
Dworkin has his favorite cases to cite on this point. He mentions
the 1978 U.S. Supreme Court case of Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, where it was argued that the Endangered Species Act required
halting the completion of a vast dam in its final stages of
construction at a huge waste of public funds. 5 ° The Act requires
that once a species has been identified as threatened with extinction
in a particular habitat, no governmental action may be taken that
might jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species
or result in the destruction or modification of its habitat.'5 ' At the
time the Act was passed, the Tellico Dam in Tennessee was already
partially built."2 In the late stages of its construction, however, a
small species of fish-the snail darter-was identified as
endangered by the project. 153 An immense amount of money had
already been spent on the dam, but more work needed to be done to
complete it. 54 The question was whether the statute required the
work on the dam to be halted immediately for the sake of the snail
darter, or whether the Endangered Species Act should be read in a
common sense way that would not prevent the completion of
projects initiated long before its enactment.'55 Is the law that
governs this case the literal text of the statute or the statute read in
a way that avoids alarmingly costly and counterintuitive results?
14 See DWORKIN, supra note 117, at 3-43 (discussing disagreements about law as they
relate to our concept of law).
149 Cf NEILMACCORMICK, RHETORICANDTHE RULE OFLAw 27 (2005) ("These contests are
not some kind of a pathological excrescence on a system that would otherwise run smoothly.
They are an integral element in a legal order that is working according to the ideal of the
Rule of Law.").
150 DWORKIN, supra note 117, at 20-23 (discussing Tenn. ValleyAuth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978)).
151 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
152 Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 172.
153 Id. at 161-62.
154 Id. at 172.
15 Id. at 172-74.
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Any plausible account of what went on in this case shows the two
sides disagreeing about how to infer legal requirements from the
same mass of legal materials.
Another example of legal disagreement cited by Dworkin is
the 1980 decision of the California Supreme Court in Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories,56 addressing the allocation of tort liability on
the basis of market share.'57 Where a plaintiff has used a
product-such as a pharmaceutical drug-supplied by a number of
different manufacturers and suffered harm as a result of negligence
in the manufacture of the product, is it right to assign liability to
each manufacturer on the basis of market share without proof that
any particular defendant caused the harm that the plaintiff actually
suffered? The plaintiff might argue that this is the fairest
resolution, 5 1 one that is consonant with what we might think of as
the moral tenor of the background law. On the other hand, the
defendant might argue that the law cannot countenance liability in
this case because there is no legislative enactment or judicial
precedent directly authorizing the imposition of this sort of liability
absent proof of actual causation.5 9
I think Dworkin is right to observe that those who disagreed in
each of these cases disagreed not just about what to do, but about
what it meant to abide by the law when deciding what to do. 6 °
There was no disagreement about the facts in these cases, the terms
of any statute or precedent, or the contents of the opinions in the
array of relevant precedents. What was in contention was what to
make of all these agreed upon facts-physical and juridical-so far
as the legal disposition of the cases was concerned. If there were no
law to distract us, it might be obvious what the sensible or fair
solution in each case would be. (We should finish constructing the
15 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
117 See Ronald Dworkin, Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-5 (2004) (using fictional version of Sindell, with some slight
adaptation of facts, to make jurisprudential point that judges should first identify general
principles underlying settled laws and then apply those principles to facts of case).
'5 Id. at 4.
159 Id.
'6 See id. (arguing that outcome of difficult cases "depends on the best answer to the
difficult question of which set of principles provides the best justification for the law in [a
particular] area as a whole").
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dam and make each pharmaceutical company pay Mrs. Sindell a fair
measure of damages.) But in a system of law, the pragmatic pursuit
of good outcomes is sometimes constrained by statutes, precedents,
principles, and doctrines. In each of these cases, there was plenty
of material to establish a sense that the law placed some constraint
on what should be done; the contention was only about what that
legal constraint amounted to.
If it is not unnatural to say that the two sides in Tennessee Valley
Authority and the two sides in Sindell disagreed about what the
relevant law was, then it is also not unnatural to say that they
disagreed about what the Rule of Law required for the disposition
of each case. This is because the Rule of Law is also a highly
contestable idea.16' Jurists disagree about whether the Rule of Law
requires rule by anything other than rules; they disagree about
whether rule by judicial decision represents the Rule of Law or the
rule of men; they disagree about whether statutory law, common
law, customary law, or constitutional law should be taken as a
paradigm for the Rule of Law; they disagree about whether the Rule
of Law is conceived as a way of framing moral and political
arguments in a community, or as a way of settling these arguments;
and they disagree about whether or not the exercise of official
discretion should be regarded as consistent with the Rule of Law
when it is framed and authorized by statute.'62
In the name of legality, one side in Tennessee Valley Authority
urged submission to the literal terms of the enactment, insisting
that it was not for the courts to form any "individual appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by
the Congress,"'63 while the other side insisted that legality required
the exercise of intelligence and common sense when selecting among
possible interpretations of the statutory text.'64 Similarly, the
161 For an explanation ofwhat I mean by the contestability of the Rule of Law, see Fallon,
supra note 18, at 6 and Waldron, supra note 7, at 148 n.29, which define the Rule of Law as
an "essentially contestable concept"-with evaluative as well as descriptive elements-whose
correct application requires more than a simple appeal to ordinary usage.
162 See Waldron, supra note 7, at 140-48 for citations and details of these disagreements.
163 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
164 See id. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("I view it as the duty of this Court to adopt a
permissible construction that accords with some modicum of common sense and the public
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parties in Sindell disagreed about the constraints the Rule of Law
imposes on one's thinking about a good-or fair or
appropriate-solution to a public policy problem. According to one
view, legality requires courts to limit liability on the basis of
fundamental and long-established rules about causation.165 Under
the prevailing view in Sindell, however, it would not be
incompatible with the Rule of Law for courts to adapt existing
principles to the realities of contemporary complex commercial
society in a thoughtful and consistent way (consistent with the spirit
of their previous application).'66 So there is disagreement about
what the Rule of Law requires as well as disagreement about what
the law is.
It is Dworkin's view-and I think he is right-that disagreements
about what constitutes law in these cases and about what the Rule
of Law requires amount to the same disagreement.'67 We cannot
sensibly drive a wedge between the claim that the judges disagreed
about what the Rule of Law---or, as it is sometimes called,
legality 6 5-required in these cases and the claim that the judges
disagreed about what the law required. In Sindell, for example:
We can sensibly think that though the law rejects [the
plaintiff's] claim for damages according to market share,
justice supports that claim. Or (less plausibly) the other
way around: that though the law grants her that claim,
justice condemns it. But it would be nonsense to
suppose that though the law, properly understood,
grants her a right to recovery, the value of legality
argues against it. Or that though the law, properly
weal.").
'r' See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 942 (1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that majority's holding does violence to "traditional tort principles by the drastic
expansion of liability proposed").
16 See id. at 936 ('The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior
doctrine ... or to fashion remedies to meet... changing needs.").
167 See Dworkin, supra note 157, at 24-25 (describing "intimate connection" between
legality and claims of law).
'6 See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Dworkin, supra note 157, at 24
(associating "legality" with "rule of law").
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understood, denies her a right to recovery, legality would
nevertheless be served by making the companies pay. 6 9
It is evident in these cases, and thousands more, that there is
intense disagreement among judges and lawyers about what it
means to solve certain problems legally-as opposed to
pragmatically-and what it is to constrain one's moral or pragmatic
solutions on the basis of what the law requires. Since this
disagreement exists anyway, we should not be upset by any
complaint about the introduction of contestability into the law on
the account that I have given. Law is already contestable in cases
like Sindell and Tennessee Valley Authority, and so the best way to
characterize that contestability is to accept that disagreements
about the Rule of Law are bound up with the very concept of law
itself.
IX. PROCESS AND SErrLEMENT IN THE RULE OF LAW
I stated in Part II of this Essay that most conceptions of the Rule
of Law emphasize the importance of determinacy and settlement. 7 °
For these, the essence of the Rule of Law is predictability-people
want to know where they stand.'7 ' Accordingly, such conceptions
highlight the role of rules rather than standards, literal meanings
rather than systemic inferences, direct applications rather than
arguments, and ex ante clarity rather than labored
interpretations.'72 Conceptions of this kind are very popular. 73 So,
169 Dworkin, supra note 157, at 25.
170 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 12, at 152-57 (arguing that general applicability of
abstract rules of law is important attribute which allows individuals to predict consequences
of their actions).
172 See Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 9-11 (Carnegie
Endowment Working Papers, Paper No. 30, 2002), available at httpJ/www.carnegieendowm
ent.orgtfiles/wp30.pdf (describing World Bank ideal of Rule of Law); see also James R.
Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminancy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of
Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 517-21 (2006) (discussing threat of indeterminancy to Rule of
Law); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175, 1186-87
(1989) (arguing that, where possible, Rule of Law requires that legal determinations reflect
general rules as opposed to balancing modes of analysis or "totality of the circumstances");
Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the Rule of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91,92-97,120-23 (2007)
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it is natural to think that the Rule of Law must condemn the
uncertainty that arises out of law's argumentative character.
But I also said in Part II that there was another current in our
Rule-of-Law thinking which emphasizes argument, procedure, and
reason, as opposed to rules, settlement, and determinacy. This
theme sometimes struggles to be heard. 74 But, as I argued at the
end of Part II, it is often quite prominent in public and political use
of the Rule of Law ideal.'75 The most common political complaint
about the Rule of Law is that governments have interfered with the
operation of the courts, compromised the independence of the
judiciary, or made decisions affecting people's interests or liberties
in a way that denies them their day in court-their chance to make
an argument on their own behalf.176
Here is my claim: If we understand the relation between the
concept of law and the Rule of Law in the way that I have urged us
to understand it, then the importance of the second procedural
current is obvious. No conception of law will be adequate if it fails
to accord a central role to institutions like courts, and to their
distinctive procedures and practices, such as legal argumentation.
Conceptual accounts of law that only emphasize rules and say
nothing more about legal institutions than that some institutions
make rules and some apply them are too casual in their
understanding of what a legal system is; they are like
understandings of democracy that neglect the central role of
elections. A philosophy of law is impoverished as a general theory
if it pays no attention to the formalized procedural aspects of courts
and hearings or to more elementary features of natural justice like
(discussing rigid substantive conception of Rule of Law and arguing that such conception
cannot account for political changes in response to circumstances over time).
173 See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 96 (1998)
(defining Rule of Law as system in which laws are public knowledge, clear in meaning, and
apply equally to all); Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INTL
L. 353,370-72 (2006) (arguing that Rule of Law is best understood as "causeway" establishing
stable institutional environment that permits calculation of risk and affords predictability).
174 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 173, at 354-58 (arguing that Russian Federation uses law
as metaphorical tool, subjecting citizens to arbitrary and capricious interference by
government in all aspects of life, including operation of courts).
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offering both sides an opportunity to be heard. Failing to capture
this in abstract terms, or regarding it as just a contingent feature of
some legal systems and not others-and therefore beneath the
notice of general jurisprudence-can make conceptual analysis in
jurisprudence seem empty and irrelevant. Even if one could defend
focusing solely on the rules themselves, a philosophy of law is still
impoverished if it pays no attention to the defining role of law's
aspiration to achieve coherence among the norms that it contains
and to the forms of reasoned argumentation that are involved both
in maintaining consistency and in bringing it to bear in the
application of norms to particular cases.
Neil MacCormick has pointed out various ways in which law is
an argumentative discipline, and I am greatly indebted to his
account.' No analytic theory of what law is and what distinguishes
legal systems from other systems of governance can afford to ignore
this aspect of our legal practice and the distinctive role it plays in a
legal system's respect for ordinary citizens as active centers of
intelligence. The fallacy of modern positivism is its exclusive
emphasis on the command-and-control aspect of law, without any
reference to the culture of argument that it frames, sponsors, and
institutionalizes. The institutionalized recognition of a distinctive
set of norms may be an important feature, but at least as important
is what we do in law with the norms that we identify. We do not
just obey them or apply the sanctions that they ordain; we argue
over them adversarially, we use our sense of what is at stake in
their application to license a continual process of argument, and we
engage in elaborate interpretive exercises about what it means to
apply them faithfully as a system to the cases that come before us.
When positivists in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart pay attention to
this aspect of interpretation and argument, they tend to treat it as
an occasional and problematic sideline. 7 ' The impression given is
" See MACCORMICi, supra note 149, at 14-15, 26-28 (discussing "arguable character of
law" and arguing that process of evaluating relative strengths of competing arguments is "a
matter of more or less, a matter of opinion, calling for judg[ Iment").
178 See HART, supra note 26, at 135 (recognizing that there are circumstances where courts
must strike balance by weighing adversaries' arguments, but concluding that "the life of the
law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of officials and private individuals by
determinate rules").
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that in most cases, the authoritative identification of legal norms
using a rule of recognition is sufficient; once it is recognized, a legal
norm can become a straightforward guide to official action.
Occasionally the language is unclear, however, because words have
open texture or because our aims are indeterminate, or because for
some other reason there is a hiccough in the interface between
words and the facts to which they apply. Unfortunately, we are
then left with no choice but to argue the matter through. 7 ' And
usually, the positivist will add, the upshot is that the court will just
have to cut through the Gordian knot of argumentation and make
a new rule, which can be recognized and applied more readily
without any attendant controversy.180
But this account radically underestimates the point that
argumentation-about what this or that provision means, or what
may be the effect of a given array of precedents-is business as
usual in law. We would be uneasy about counting a system that did
not exhibit such argumentation and make routine provision for it as
a legal system. And since it is a central part of our understanding
of what a legal system is, it should also play a significant role in the
ideal of the Rule of Law-as Finnis puts it, in the account we give
of "the state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good
shape.
In this Essay, I have contrasted two views of the concept of law
and two views of the Rule of Law. So far as the concept of law is
concerned, we have what I call the "casual positivism" of Hart and
his followers, contrasted with the richer account that I developed in
Part V. The former emphasizes rules-primary rules identified by
a secondary rule of recognition, together with a minimalist account
of the institutions that produce and apply them. The latter pays
more attention to the distinctive institutional features of a legal
system and to the practices and modes of argumentation that they
sponsor and accommodate. So far as the Rule of Law is concerned,
179 See id. at 124-36 (arguing that open texture of language produces uncertainty at
margins when general rules of law are used).
"'o See id. at 135-36 (arguing that courts perform rule-producing function at margins
where there is uncertainty about applicability of rules).
181 FINNIS, supra note 126, at 270.
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we have one conception that emphasizes the determinacy of enacted
norms and the predictability of their application, and another, richer
conception that also emphasizes procedural due process and the
presence and importance of formally structured argument on behalf
of ordinary citizens.
These might be regarded as separate controversies, but I believe
they are intimately connected with one another. There is a natural
correlation between a conceptual account of law (COL1) that
emphasizes rules and a Rule of Law ideal (ROL1) that concentrates
on their characteristics like their generality, determinacy, etc.
Additionally, there is a natural correlation between a conceptual
account of law (COL 2) that focuses not just on the general norms
established in a society but on the distinctive procedural features of
the institutions that administer them, and an account of the Rule of
Law (ROL 2) that is less fixated on predictability and more insistent
on the opportunities for argumentation and responsiveness to
argument that legal institutions provide. These correlations can be
expressed graphically as follows:
THE CONCEPT OF LAW THE RULE OF LAW
COL 1: ROL,:
casual positivism: determinacy, predictability,
primary and secondary rules settlement, etc.
COL2: ROL 2:
courts, norms, systematicity, procedural due process and
etc. opportunity for argument
Conceivably, this correlation could be shaken loose by an insistence
that the concept of law and the Rule of Law are to be understood
quite independently of each other. Then, we might imagine someone
acknowledging the need to move from COL, to COL 2 while still
sticking with a conception of the Rule of Law (ROL) that does not
go beyond the formal characteristics of rules. Or, we could imagine
a positivist adhering dogmatically to COL1, but acknowledging the
importance of a separate Rule of Law ideal that emphasizes
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procedural and argumentative values. But these combinations seem
odd; they treat the Rule of Law as a rather mysterious ideal-with
its own underlying values, to be sure, but quite unrelated to our
understanding of law itself. It is simply one of a number of ideals
(such as justice, liberty, or equality) that we apply to law, rather
than anything more intimately connected with the very idea of law
itself.
I have argued, on the contrary, that the Rule of Law as a
normative ideal arises out of our understanding of what law is. It
represents a natural trajectory of normative thought projected out
from the normative significance of law's defining features. It seems
to follow that just as a conception of law would be impoverished if
it emphasized only the existence of rules and the bare minimum of
institutions necessary to apply them, so too would a conception of
the Rule of Law be impoverished as an ideal if it (1) emphasized
only the clarity that crisp and determinate rules provide and the
settlement and predictability that follow from their straightforward
application, and (2) neglected (or, even worse, denigrated) the value
we should give to law's procedural, rational, and argumentative
aspects.
Whether we end up with an impoverished conception of law itself,
an impoverished version of the Rule of Law, or-more likely-both,
the damage to our understanding of the distinctive value of law is
likely to be quite considerable. The concept of law will end up
accommodating, and the Rule of Law will end up idealizing, aspects
of governance that look quite demeaning and unpleasant from the
point of view of what we value in legal practice-indeed, quite
demeaning and unpleasant even from the point of view of those who
extol ROL,.
Let me explain. I do not think that a conception of law or a
conception of the Rule of Law that sidelines the importance of
argumentation can really do justice to the value we place on
governments to treat ordinary citizens with respect as active centers
of intelligence. The demand for clarity and predictability is
commonly made in the name of individual freedom-the freedom of
the Hayekian individual in charge of his own destiny who needs to
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know where he stands so far as social order is concerned.182 But
with the best will in the world, and with even the most determinate-
seeming law, circumstances and interactions can be treacherous.
From time to time, the free Hayekian individual will find himself
charged or accused of some violation, or his business will be
subject-as he thinks, unjustly or irregularly-to some detrimental
rule. Some such cases may be clear, but others may be matters of
dispute. An individual who values his freedom enough to demand
the sort of calculability, to which the Hayekian image of freedom
under law is supposed to cater, is not someone who we can imagine
always tamely accepting a charge or determination that he has done
something wrong. He will have a point of view on that, and he will
seek an opportunity to bring that to bear when it is a question of
applying a rule to his case. And, when he brings his point of view
to bear, we can imagine his plaintiff or his prosecutor responding
with a point of view whose complexity and tendentiousness matches
his own. And so it begins-legal argumentation and the use of the
facilities that the law creates for the formal airing of arguments." 3
Courts, hearings, and arguments are aspects of law which are not
optional extras; they are integral parts of how law works and they
are indispensable to the package of law's respect for human agency.
To say that we should value aspects of governance that promote the
clarity and determinacy of rules for the sake of individual freedom,
but not the opportunities for argumentation that a free and self-
possessed individual is likely to demand, is to truncate what the
Rule of Law rests upon: respect for the freedom and dignity of each
person as an active center of intelligence.
The Rule of Law and the concept of law can inform each other
and protect each other against the prospect of that impoverishment.
Our conception of what law is is our best guide to what matters
182 See HAYEK, supra note 12, at 148-61 (arguing that individuals achieve freedom under
law when they obey general abstract rules, as opposed to another man's will, and that society
can achieve order through reliance on such rules).
'" For a fine account of this, see MACCORMICK, supra note 149, at 12-31, which describes
the tension between the Rule of Law-which is supposed to provide certainty and
predictability-and the argumentative character of law, and arguing that reconciliation is
possible if the Rule of Law is viewed as dynamic rather than static, allowing new certainties
to emerge from old certainties through rational argument.
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about law, and a full understanding of how the legal system matters
to us is our best guide to what is distinctive about legal as opposed
to non-legal modes of governance. The alternative, I fear, is an
impoverished concept of positive law, which emphasizes nothing
more than the existence of two kinds of rules, and an impoverished
account of the Rule of Law, which treats everything besides the
determinacy of the rules as though it did not matter.

